Governing local security in the eastern Congo: decentralization, police reform and interventions in the chieftaincy of Buhavu. by Thill, Michel & Cimanuka, Abel
[Copy and paste completed cover here}
Governing local security in the 
eastern Congo Decentralization, 
police reform and interventions in 
the chieftaincy of Buhavu
MICHEL THILL AND ABEL CIMANUKA
rift valley institute and vnG international report 2
acknowledgements
This report is the result of VNGi’s willingness to invest in open-ended research. We 
would like to thank Volkert Doop, Caroline Herouan-Guy and Chloé Krantz in The Hague, 
and Albert Kitenge Ilosyo and Solange Nabintu Kahasha in Bukavu for their support 
throughout the research process. A particular note of gratitude goes to Loochi Muza-
liwa, VNGi project coordinator and expert in Bukavu, who provided hands-on advise 
during fieldwork, shared his deep understanding on issues of local governance in the 
eastern Congo and commented on a first draft. We would also like to thank Kasper Hoff-
mann for his thorough peer-review and valuable comments. A draft version of this report 
was presented in front of high-level provincial and national Congolese stakeholders in 
Bukavu and Kinshasa in November and December 2019, whose interest and feedback 
we are grateful for. This report draws on the generous contributions of Congolese poli-
ticians, administrators, police and army officers, civil society activists, and community 
representatives. We would like to thank them for their knowledge, time, hospitality and 
generosity without which writing this report would not have been possible. All ambigu-
ities, misrepresentations or errors which remain are entirely our own.
Cover image: A suggestion box at a police station encouraging civilians to engage the police on 
matters of local security. Installed on the police's own initiative, so far the box remains heavily 
underused. Minova, DRC, July 2019 © Michel Thill
Michel Thill is a Doctoral Research Fellow with the Conflict Research Group (CRG) at Ghent 
University. His PhD research explores police practices and the daily negotiation of public order 
in Bukavu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Michel is an associate of the Bukavu-based 
Groupe d’Etudes sur les Conflits et la Sécurité Humaine (GEC-SH) and a Fellow of RVI, whose 
Great Lakes programme he was responsible for from 2012 to 2016.
Abel Cimanuka Kajuci, lawyer by training, is the Executive Secretary of the Conseil Local pour la 
Sécurité de Proximité (CLSP, Local Council for Proximity Security) of the municipality of Ibanda 
in the city of Bukavu in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. He is an expert and 
independent consultant in the field of security sector reform and in particular in police reform, 
civil engagement and human security.
This research was made possible through VNG International and its programme 'Inawezekana 
Kalehe'. The views, thoughts and opinions expressed in the text belong solely to the author, 
and not necessarily to the VNG International, the consortium partners in the programme, the 
programme’s funding entity or any other group or individual.
The Rift Valley Institute works in eastern and central Africa to bring local knowledge to bear on 
social, political and economic development.




2. A History of security governance in the Congo 10
 The Congo Free State (1885–1908) 10
 The Belgian Congo (1908–1960) 11
 The Mobutist state (1965–1997) 12
 The Congo Wars and their aftermath (1996–present) 14
3. Decentralization and police reform in the Congo 16
 Creating new layers of extraction and control 16
 Reforming the police 18
4. Governing local security in Kalehe 23
 Policing rural Kalehe 23
 Taking responsibility for local security 26
 Budgeting for local security 29
 Fragmented civil society in Buzi 31
 Coping with insecurity 32
5. Supporting the application of the 2013 CLSP decree in Buhavu 37
 Limits to applying the CLSP 38
 The cadre de concertation 43
 The budget participatif 45
6. Conclusion and policy considerations 47
Glossary of acronyms, words and phrases 51
Bibliography 53
Map. Kalehe, Buhavu and Buzi in South Kivu, eastern DRC 4
Box 1. The CLSP and FQ: Success in the city 20
Box 2. A brief overview of Kalehe, Buhavu and Buzi 22
Box 3. Major fault lines in the history of Buzi 33
rift valley institute and vnG international report 4


































































Cinq collines, contested 









 MAPgrax 2019Base map data source: OpenStreetMap
GoverninG local security in the eastern conGo 5
summary
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC or Congo), security governance is compet-
itive, fragmented and marked by violence. Multiple actors—state and non-state—vie for 
influence and many areas of the country lack effective structures to ensure that their resi-
dents live in safety and security. In this context, the threat and use of violence has become 
central to the state’s efforts to maintain social control and public order. This tendency has 
come to shape the troubled relationship between Congolese citizens and the army and 
police, reflected in numerous fraught day-to-day interactions. Two ongoing processes—
administrative decentralization and police reform—have been designed to turn a page on 
past practices, bring government and security closer to the population and, consequently, 
improve this relationship. While they have had some successes, they also risk the re-cre-
ation of existing governance dynamics within newly empowered local administrative and 
security-related entities. 
Decentralization and police reform 
Decentralization is intended to bring government closer to its citizens, making it more 
responsive and improving public services. However, instead of becoming more account-
able and increasing service provision, chiefs of newly decentralized administrative entities 
have begun to mimic long-standing state practices of resource extraction from the popu-
lation, while providing only limited and irregular public services in return. 
Police reform aims to establish an apolitical and preventive police service that works 
closely with communities and is thus able to respond to their security needs. But this 
model also risks disrupting past security governance practices. A police force that works 
for citizens and does not extract resources from them threatens revenue streams, which 
help maintain the current structure of elite power. Preventive and democratic policing 
principles also inhibit the use of repressive force necessary to maintain and secure the 
regime. 
Both decentralization and police reform constitute a major break from past structures of 
governance, which generally did not work to serve the population, but rather to protect 
the interests of those in power. Instead of replacing these abusive structures, these two 
processes have added new layers of complexity to security governance. Moreover, they 
have not been adequately resourced to make them effective.
introducing the clsp
Despite these fundamental challenges, police reform has had some successes. The most 
significant of these is the establishment of the Conseil local pour la sécurité de proximité 
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(CLSP, Local Council for Proximity Security), which was anchored in Congolese law through 
a decree passed in 2013. 
The CLSP is a coordination platform dedicated to human security which brings together 
representatives from the administration, police, justice and civil society to find joint and 
sustainable responses to problems of local security at the level of the entités territori-
ales décentralisées (ETD, decentralized territorial entities). CLSPs draw on information 
provided by the Forums de quartier (FQ, Neighbourhood Forums) in cities and Forums de 
groupement (FG, Grouping Forums) in rural areas, to compose local security diagnostics 
and plans.  
As part of the police reform process, CLSPs were set up and tested in three pilot cities 
across the country: Matadi, Kananga and Bukavu. Their relative success in improving 
police–community relations encouraged reformers to establish them in rural areas. 
However, the donor withdrew their support in 2014, which has considerably slowed down 
the expansion of CLSPs in rural areas. 
In 2019, the new national government pledged to reinvigorate police reform. The new 
provincial government in South Kivu also called for the establishment of CLSPs across 
the province, thus announcing a potentially profound intervention in prevailing and often 
precarious local security governance arrangements. 
The chieftaincy of Buhavu in Kalehe territory in South Kivu offers valuable insights into 
the introduction of CLSPs in the rural DRC. There are, however, a number of significant 
challenges, which range from a scarcity of resources, to the area’s particularly complex 
security environment. This includes multiple armed groups, conflicts among communities 
and in civil society organizations, and competition for security responsibilities between 
centralized and decentralized administrators. 
In the absence of a coherent security strategy, local communities, leaders, authorities, 
and state and non-state security actors have little choice but to seek practical arrange-
ments and compromises to cope with insecurity. The necessary, and constant, process of 
communication and exchange—keeping all actors engaged and cooperating in this over-
crowded space—shows how authorities and communities attempt to govern security in 
practice. 
These practices of engagement, communication and inclusion at the village level also 
capture the spirit of the CLSP, which the police reform process aims to establish at ETD 
levels. Local governance practices may thus serve to inspire and empower higher-level 
administrators in establishing CLSPs and move towards formalizing security governance 
in their entities.  
intervening in local security governance
Outside interventions in security governance face steep challenges. Nevertheless, the CLSP 
remains a promising development in government efforts to bring state security actors and 
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communities closer together. It thus merits outside support. Previous interventions could, 
however, draw more lessons from the cities where police reform was piloted and where 
the CLSP and the FQs continue to function, if irregularly. 
The purpose of the CLSP is often misunderstood by outsiders. Moreover, the CLSP is 
sometimes confused in form and aim with the Conseil local de sécurité (CLS, Local Security 
Council), a council of state security actors situated at all administrative levels. The CLS is 
not anchored in Congolese law but is based on long-standing practice. It takes operational 
decisions and is closed to the public.
Attempts by outsiders to organize and mobilize communities for the sake of better coop-
eration with state security actors risk creating parallel structures of civil society, which 
only increases fragmentation instead of leading to meaningful grassroots involvement. 
To improve local security governance in the DRC, those working on and intervening in it 
should consider the following:
1. thinking human security—placing it at the forefront of security-related planning—
ought to precede all other efforts. The sooner security governance actors start to do 
so, the more likely their proposals and actions will be aligned with the principle of 
putting the security needs of the population at the heart of their initiatives. 
2. Engaging meaningfully with the police is a prerequisite for any outside intervention 
into local security governance. After all, the CLSP is a direct result of police reform and 
functions as the key instrument in improving police–community relations. To ensure 
police buy-in, interventions could provide human rights and basic legal training, 
support logistics and facilitate joint police–community activities.
3. To maximize the potential of the CLSP decree, all security governance actors first 
need to fully appreciate its main purpose—inclusion and regular exchange—and the 
flexibility of its legal framework, which allows its structures to be shaped to local real-
ities and exigencies. For outside interveners, it is also important to invest sufficient 
resources, time and energy to prepare the ground on which to establish the CLSP 
and to implicate and learn from specialists involved in urban police reform and its 
successes.
4. Budgeting for security can be accomplished by drawing on and reorganizing existing 
funds at the disposal of chiefs of decentralized entities. Lobbying the participatory 
budget, a well-functioning donor-supported initiative, to finance projects with a direct 
relevance to local security is also worth pursuing.
5. Mobilizing chieftaincies to take up their responsibilities in the realm of security is 
ultimately the most important, yet also most difficult task. Outside interveners could 
draw on peer-pressure from those chiefs in the Congo and elsewhere who lead by 
example in order to encourage others. Accompanying both decentralized chieftaincies 
and centralized administrations in improving their work relations could also go a long 
way in ensuring a more efficient provision of security to the Congo’s communities.
rift valley institute and vnG international report 8
1. Introduction
In June 2019, the newly elected governor of South Kivu, Théo Ngwabije Kasi, announced 
his aim to make operational the Conseil local pour la sécurité de proximité (CLSP, Local 
Council for Proximity Security).1 The CLSP, anchored in law in 2013, works to find sustain-
able responses to problems of insecurity at the local level. Two months later, the national 
government announced its intention to revisit the continued reform of the Police Natio-
nale Congolaise (PNC, Congolese National Police), draft a new reference plan for the 
reform, provide for a ‘consequential’ budget to go along with it, build additional police 
stations and establish a Police de proximité (proximity police) across the country.2 After 
years of slow progress, police reform has been reaffirmed as a priority of the government 
agenda both at national and provincial levels.
The CLSP is a result of the continued reform of the PNC. It is a security coordination plat-
form bringing together representatives from the administration, police, judiciary and civil 
society, who jointly elaborate plans addressing issues of local security and public order at 
the level of the recently decentralized urban communes (municipalities), the rural secteurs 
(sectors) and chefferies (chieftaincies).3 From 2012 onwards, CLSPs were set up in three 
pilot cities across the country: Matadi, Kananga and Bukavu. Their relative success in 
improving police–community relations in the pilot cities encouraged reformers to insti-
tute CLSPs in rural areas. Donor funding was withdrawn in 2014, however, which has not 
only slowed down the expansion of the CLSPs, but efforts at police reform more generally.
In the context of the new government’s intention to revitalize police reform, it is important 
to understand the potential challenges associated with introducing CLSPs in rural areas. 
The vast majority of entités territoriales décentralisées (ETDs, decentralized territorial 
entities) are rural entities, which are markedly different from their urban counterparts. 
Installing CLSPs also means disrupting prevailing security governance arrangements, 
which may trigger local resistance. 
There are several challenges that may affect the applicability of the CLSP decree in rural 
areas. This report, based on research carried out in the chieftaincy of Buhavu in Kalehe 
1 Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Décret Nr. 13/041 du 16 septembre 2013 portant création, 
organisation et fonctionnement des Conseils Locaux pour la Sécurité de Proximité’, Kinshasa: 
Prime Minister’s Office, 2013 (on file with author).
2 Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Programme du Gouvernement’, Kinshasa: Prime Minister’s Office, 
August 2019, 6–7 (on file with author).
3 Provincial Governor’s Office (South Kivu), ‘Discours-Programme du Gouvernement Provincial 
prononcé par Son Excellence Monsieur Théo Ngwabidje Kasi, Gouverneur de Province, à 
l’Assemblée Provinciale du Sud-Kivu’, Bukavu, 11 June 2019 (on file with author).
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territory in South Kivu,4 outlines what these challenges are and situates them in a larger 
analytical framework of security governance. While the application of the CLSP decree 
in rural areas faces challenges, which may not consistently allow for its strict enactment, 
none of these should constitute an obstacle to the unfolding of the decree in spirit; namely, 
the desire for regular and inclusive communication among all relevant security actors in a 
given administrative entity.  
At the lowest administrative level, administrators, communities and armed actors who 
confront the most testing conditions do come together from time to time to carve out 
security arrangements (often somewhat precarious in nature) in an effort to facilitate 
coexistence. Observing these practices may inspire higher-level administrators at the ETD, 
territorial and provincial level to resist the tendency to present the difficulties in imple-
menting the CLSP in rural areas as an excuse to remain inactive, but to instead use it as a 
tool of empowerment and take action in matters of local security.
4 The research commissioned by Dutch organization VNG International as part of their ongoing 
work on increasing mutual accountability between local government and communities in Kalehe, 
took place in July 2019. The researchers conducted 27 interviews and one focus group, speaking 
to a total of 34 persons including policemen, state attorneys, state administrators, army officers, 
civil society representatives and NGO staff.
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2. a history of security governance in the congo
Security governance is directly linked to questions of territorial and public administration. 
A hallmark in the history of security governance in the Congo has been a tension between 
extraction and the self-enrichment of those in power, the desire to control populations 
as much as possible and the cost of maintaining a security apparatus capable of doing so. 
This tension has directly impacted the security practices of the police and army, which in 
turn have shaped the troubled relationship between them and civilians at large. 
the congo free state (1885–1908) 
There are many different ways to govern people and territory. In the precolonial Congo, 
the larger, more centralized empires and kingdoms of the Kongo, Luba and Lunda had 
relative control over the core of their territories, while opting to govern their peripheries 
through a combination of alliances and military raids. They considered the cost of estab-
lishing an effective and direct administration in these borderlands as simply too high a 
price to pay for the expected return. Others tried and failed, and still others imposed a 
system of indirect rule. In precolonial Kalehe, a variety of political entities existed in close 
proximity. To the west and closer to the Congo basin, the Tembo and Nyanga lived in small, 
tightly knit communities. The Havu who called the shores of Lake Kivu home, had a more 
centralized polity. Regardless of political organization, however, the people of this region 
were all highly mobile and interconnected, trading goods and exchanging ideas.5
Once Belgian King Leopold II had successfully managed to claim the Congo basin as his, 
naming it the Congo Free State (1885–1908), he was determined for his colony to pay its 
own way via local taxation. This imperative shaped the way he governed the territory: 
Through a regime of merciless extraction. The Congo Free State established and kept the 
control necessary for efficient exploitation through the combination of three approaches. 
First, it had a relatively small armed force, the Force publique (FP, Public Force), which 
functioned as both police and army. Second, it maintained a network of fragile and ever-
changing pacts with local chiefs and leaders, and their auxiliary troops. Third, it gave 
considerable liberties to private conglomerates in securing their concessions through 
their own sentries. The limited financial means at the disposal of administrators had a 
direct impact on how the FP and its local and private allies went about their work. That 
is, the troops ‘were plunder machines as well as conquering armies: not or inadequately 
provisioned they largely lived off the land, raiding for food, slaves and war booty wherever 
they passed’.6
5 Jan Vansina, ‘A Comparison of African Kingdoms’, Africa: Journal of the International African 
Institute 32/4 (1962).
6 Aldwin Roes, ‘Towards a History of Mass Violence in the Etat Indépendant du Congo, 1885–
1908’, South African Historical Journal 62/4 (2010): 637.
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In the easternmost parts of the Congo Free State, the FP fought a war with its declared 
enemy, the Sultanate of Zanzibar and its slave traders, who had established trading posts 
along the Congo River well before the creation of the Congo Free State. War required 
food and porters, which the soldiers either simply raided from nearby peoples or which 
local chiefs were forced to provide at the displeasure of their communities. This violent 
security machinery, made up of a mosaic of armed state and non-state security actors, 
lacked effective central control; rather, its governance was as dispersed as the mosaic was 
fragmented.7
The colonial state only unfolded its full might in its eastern regions in the years following 
the end of Leopold’s Congo Free State. Indeed, only in 1911 did colonial agents demarcate 
the most eastern borders, paving the way for the Belgian Congo to extend its grasp to the 
shores of Lake Kivu.8
the Belgian congo (1908–1960)
While the most excessive forms of plunder, atrocities and mass violence subsided after the 
Belgian annexation of the Congo Free State in 1908, much of its violent and exploitative 
culture of governance remained in place, along with the coercive practices associated 
with it. Emphasizing continuities rather than discontinuities, one observer notes that ‘as 
a colony, the Belgian Congo was strongly marked by the Leopoldian legacy as a system 
of economic exploitation, political repression and cultural oppression’.9 Forced labour 
practices continued and, during the Second World War with its enormous demands for 
labour, reached levels of coercion not dissimilar to those under Leopold. In terms of public 
and territorial administration, the Belgian colonial administration progressively intensified 
its penetration of the Congo to an extent not seen in most other African colonies. Over 
several decades of colonial rule, traditional Congolese political structures were reorga-
nized, regrouped, abolished or invented to fit a highly centralized, unitary and symmetric 
Napoleonic logic of administration. At its most local level, the colonial state eventually 
established a system of indirect rule in which it relied on allied chiefs and local leaders to 
keep order over and tax the local population on their behalf.10
7 Kasper Hoffmann, Koen Vlassenroot and Gauthier Marchais, ‘Taxation, stateness and armed 
groups: Public Authority and Resource Extraction in Eastern Congo’, Development and Change 
47/6 (2016): 1437–1438.
8 Gillian Mathys, ‘People on the move: Frontiers, borders, mobility and history in the Lake Kivu 
region, 19th to 20th century’, PhD thesis, Ghent University, Ghent, 2014: 130–136.
9 Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila. A People’s History. London: 
Zed Books, 2002: 26. Also see: Benoit Henriet, ‘Ordering the Wetlands: Policing and Legitimate 
Violence in the Leverville Concession (Belgian Congo, 1911–1920)’, in Policing in Colonial 
Empires: Cases, Connections, Boundaries (ca. 1850–1970), eds. Emmanuel Blanchard, Marieke 
Bloembergen and Amandine Lauro, Berlin: Peter Lang, 2017.
10 Mahmood Mamdani, ‘Preliminary Thoughts on the Congo Crisis’, Social Text 60 (1999): 
53–62.
rift valley institute and vnG international report 12
In Kalehe, Havu chiefs from the more centralized political entities played along with 
colonial agents to secure themselves privileged positions in the emerging colonial admin-
istration, while communities to the west such as the Tembo showed fierce resistance and 
faced military occupation as a consequence. Once chieftaincies were regrouped and fully 
incorporated into the colonial state, colonial agents created a large Buhavu chiefdom at 
the expense of the neighbouring Tembo and other ethnic communities, which now saw 
themselves ruled by Havu. This created tension, which remains of utmost importance in 
the ongoing and partly violent conflicts and politics in Kalehe up to the present.11
Despite colonial penetration, the sheer size of the administrative entities still made it 
difficult to govern effectively. In the prefectural system of the colonial state, territorial 
administrators single-handedly carried the responsibility to project and enact its might. 
Facing the impossible task of being everywhere at once, fearing upheavals and revolts, 
and reassured by feeble oversight mechanisms to prevent the excessive use of violence, 
territorial administrators all too often fell back on coercion to ensure control. To facilitate 
their task, the colonial state markedly centralized its security apparatus. The FP turned 
into the most effective colonial army on the African continent, and, in the final decades 
of the colony, police forces became common features in urban centres, while the colo-
nial intelligence agency or political police, the Sûreté, gained a fearsome reputation. That 
security forces were regularly used to mobilize labour and round up taxes, enforce racial 
segregation and suppress political movements and aspirations merely reaffirmed the inte-
gral role violence continued to play in security governance.
The Mobutist state (1965–1997)
During the immediate post-independence years (1960–1965), the Congo decentralized 
into a federal state with a substantial degree of power located at the provincial level, 
including in matters of security. These years were marked by political fragmentation, 
secession, turmoil and civil war fuelled by Cold War politics. President Mobutu Sese Seko, 
who seized power in a coup in 1965, did not waste time recentralizing the state and its 
coercive arm in order to consolidate his rule. To a large extent, Mobutu’s efforts at state 
formation returned Zaire (as the DRC was called from 1971–1997) to the structure and 
spirit of the colonial state.12 The emerging system of patronage and competition over 
resources, however, slowly eroded state capacity, rendering it ‘corrupt and inefficient’, as 
Mobutu himself admitted.13 This had tremendous consequences for the everyday lives of 
11 Hoffmann et al., ‘Taxation, stateness and armed groups’.
12 Thomas M Callaghy, The State–Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1984, 227.
13 Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, London: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985, 221.
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Congolese citizens. Insecurity and scarcity became ‘the motoring forces behind a dialectic 
of oppression’.14
From 1966 onward, Mobutu reduced the 21 provinces of the First Republic to 8. He also 
depoliticized them by turning them into purely administrative units, eventually renamed 
as regions. Regional commissioners were directly appointed by the president and entirely 
depended on him. Under the logic of unity of command, which held together the highly 
centralized but deconcentrated state, these all-powerful prefects enjoyed much discre-
tion. They commanded over all ministries, administrations and services within their 
entities, including those of the security forces. At the same time, they were responsible 
for all matters of public and political life, from taxation to law and order, and from educa-
tion and health to infrastructure, thus facing similarly challenging tasks as their colonial 
predecessors. 
To address these governance challenges, regional commissioners and their security forces 
relied on the central government to send them their frais de fonctionnement (opera-
tional costs). From the mid-1970s onward, however, rapid economic decline meant that 
the central government sent such operational costs on an increasingly irregular basis. 
Commissioners and their agents were thus forced to improvise. This practice became 
known as ‘Système D’, derived from the popular phrase ‘débrouillez-vous’ (fend for your-
selves), or Article 15, after an imaginary article in the 1960 constitution of secessionist 
South Kasai that encouraged its officials to improvise in times of need. ‘Governance with 
empty pockets’ includes subsidizing services from one’s own pocket, charging for them, 
inventing fees, embezzling state property or asking for bribes.15 For the security services, 
the use of violence is an additional option. 
While these revenue generating practices have guaranteed the survival of the state and 
its employees, they weigh heavily on Congolese citizens and their livelihoods. Further 
worsening these tendencies is the logic of patronage through which Mobutu governed 
and which has come to permeate all state institutions. State officials double as patrons: 
They use their position to provide clients direct favours and services or to grant them 
access to revenue generating opportunities in return for loyalty. Some rank and file police, 
for example, have to pay daily or weekly fees to their superiors known as rapportage 
(reporting) which they are often only able to do by harassing civilians. Those who do not 
comply can be rotated to less lucrative posts, thrown into jail or dismissed from service.16 
As a result of Article 15 and patronage, security institutions have turned into rent producing 
structures over which elites engage in fierce competition and where positions and public 
resources are used for political and private purposes. 
14 Michael G Schatzberg, The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire, Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1988, 3.
15 Tom De Herdt and Kristof Titeca, ‘Governance with Empty Pockets: The Education Sector in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Development and Change 47/3 (2016): 472–494
16 Michel Thill, ‘Police at Work in Bukavu: Negotiating Revenue-generation in Urban Pirate 
Markets’, in Negotiating Public Services in the Congo: State, Society and Governance, eds. Tom 
De Herdt and Kristof Titeca, London: Zed Books, 2019.
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Perhaps because of these dynamics, Mobutu never quite managed to fully extend his 
grip over the security forces. Parallel units and chains of command competed with one 
another and weakened their efficacy; and their pauperization from the 1970s onward led 
to widespread harassment and abuse of civilians.17 Compared to the Belgian Congo, the 
nature of Mobutist state violence had changed. The tenuous control over police and army, 
the scarcity that marked their livelihoods and a permissive climate ‘meant that brutality 
was less focused’ and ‘the use of violence was more capricious and random’.18 Regardless 
of its nature, however, force and coercion persisted in the everyday lives of the Congolese. 
They had ‘lost none of their vitality; indeed … the ever-present threat of repressive action 
is indispensable to sustain not just the state’s hegemony, but its survival’.19
Mobutu’s drive for centralization halted at the lower levels of administration. His attempts 
to integrate collectivities—sectors and chieftaincies—and the villages below these into 
his prefectural system of governance largely failed due to a combination of lack of state 
capacity and competence, and the resistance of the chiefs and peoples in question. These 
local chiefs thus retained a fair amount of autonomy in governing their own entities, 
including in matters of justice and security. Nevertheless, the Mobutist state national-
ization of all land in the 1970s put customary chiefs in the midst of a growing crisis of 
public authority. Many used the nationalization process to sell off their customary lands 
to Congolese elites, leaving their own communities bereft of their livelihoods. Not only 
did this erode public trust in chiefs, it also led to a stark increase in competition over 
resources. In Kalehe, this competition gained ethnic undertones and laid fertile ground for 
armed mobilization in the years to come.20
The Congo Wars and their aftermath (1996–present)
In the late 1990s, the start of the Congo wars (1996–2003) and the fall of Mobutu led to 
a further fragmentation of the security landscape in the country. In the eastern DRC, with 
rapidly growing insecurity and in the absence of police, this period saw the rise of new 
local security actors, such as the nyumba kumi (ten houses). These and other low-level 
urban and rural administrators played an important role in monitoring the movement of 
visitors and the presence of foreigners, in mobilizing youth to patrol the streets at night 
17 Thierry Mayamba Nlandu, ‘Mapping Police Services in the Democratic Republic of Congo: 
Institutional Interactions at Central, Provincial and Local Levels’, IDS Research Report 71, 
Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2012; Kaumba Lufunda, ‘La formation d’une armée 
républicaine et d’une police nationale: situation et perspectives’, Congo–Afrique 470 (2012): 
726–751. An important exception to this is the Centre National de Documentation (National 
Centre for Documentation), successor of the Sûreté. See Schatzberg, Dialectics of Oppression, 
38–51.
18 Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, 261.
19 Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, 244.
20 Hoffmann et al., ‘Taxation, stateness and armed groups’; Catherine Newbury, ‘Ebutumwa 
Bw’emiogo: The Tyranny of Cassava. A Women’s Tax Revolt in Eastern Zaire’, Canadian Journal of 
African Studies 18/1 (1984): 35–54.
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and in improvising neighbourhood alarm systems when necessary.21 While their involve-
ment was born out of necessity, it also effectively decentralized security governance and 
introduced new practices, interests and agendas. 
During the transition to peace (2003–2006), several ambitious restructuring and reform 
processes were launched and continue in 2019, including that of the security forces. In prac-
tice, however, these reforms clash not only with the logic of patronage, which continues to 
permeate Congolese state institutions, but also with the purpose of the Congolese state, 
which has, since independence, functioned as a source of enrichment and protection for 
elites. Moreover, in the eastern parts of the country conflict has continued, despite repet-
itive demobilization and reintegration processes. The political manipulation of armed 
groups and the democratization of militarized politics play an important part in continued 
violence and have led to the proliferation of armed groups. In 2019, the territory of Kalehe 
alone is home to between 10 and 25 armed groups. Arguably, security governance in 
the Congo is more fragmented than ever, while the formation of an apolitical democratic 
security service very much remains a work in progress.22 
21 For an insight into the urban dimension of these dynamics, see: Judith Verweijen, ‘Violent 
Cities, Violent Society: Analyzing urban violence in the eastern Congo’, London: Rift Valley 
Institute, 2019; Karen Büscher, ‘Conflict, state failure and urban transformation in the Eastern 
Congolese periphery’, PhD thesis, Ghent University, Ghent, 2011.
22 Judith Verweijen, ‘Stable Instability: Political settlements and armed groups in the Congo’, 
London: Rift Valley Institute, 2016; Judith Verweijen and Claude Iguma, ‘Understanding Armed 
Group Proliferation in the Eastern Congo’, London: Rift Valley Institute, 2015; Christoph Vogel 
and Josaphat Musamba. ‘Recycling Rebels? Demobilization in the Congo’, London: Rift Valley 
Institute, 2016.
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3. Decentralization and police reform in the 
congo
The 2006 Congolese constitution lays the groundwork for several major reforms. This 
includes the reform of territorial administration through renewed decentralization efforts 
and police reform. In relation to the latter, the intention is to transform the police into 
an apolitical service working for and with the population, inspired by a philosophy of 
Police de proximité (proximity police, a policing model similar to community policing).23 
The context for implementing these reforms is anything but straightforward. Especially 
in the eastern Congo, where a myriad of armed groups continue to engage in small-scale 
violent conflict with one another and against the army, security governance has become 
a challenge that is beyond the grasp of the state alone. To maintain a measure of control, 
its security services enter into fluid alliances with non-state security actors; for example, 
armed groups in rural areas or youth gangs in cities. 
Decentralization and police reform have proceeded, further loosening the already precar-
ious central state hold over the security apparatus. The ambition of these reforms is to 
mark a clear departure from past governance practices and announce the beginning of 
a new era. Ultimately, however, their partial, underfunded and often inconsequential 
implementation have only further complicated security governance in the Congo.
Creating new layers of extraction and control
As in any other process of devolution, decentralization aims to bring the Congolese 
government closer to its citizens, making it more responsive and improving public services. 
Decentralization has increased the number of provinces from 11 to 26; given more polit-
ical, administrative, legal, economic and financial autonomy to provinces; and conferred 
the status of ETDs to cities and their immediate sub-entities (municipalities), as well as 
to sectors and chieftaincies (sub-entities of territories).24 While not always the case in 
practice, according to law, provincial governors and ETD chiefs are no longer nominated 
by the central government but are indirectly and directly elected in provincial, local and 
municipal elections. Provinces and ETDs also enjoy a degree of decision-making power 
in education, health and infrastructure. Security is a responsibility shared with central 
government at the provincial level, while ETD chiefs have a duty to maintain public order, 
23 Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo, ‘Constitution de la République 
démocratique du Congo’, Articles 182–186, 47th year, special number, 18 February 2006.
24 The urban administrative entities below the municipality, districts and avenue level remain 
decentralized and cannot levy taxes. Their functioning is financially dependent on the central 
administration budget. See: Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo, ‘Loi 
organique n° 10/11 du 18 mai 2010 portant fixation des subdivisions territoriales à l’intérieur des 
provinces’, Articles 35–37, Kinshasa: Cabinet du Président de la République, 7 June 2010.
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which gives them a say over local police.25 To fund these competencies, both provinces 
and ETDs can impose and collect a range of taxes in their entities. Moreover, provinces 
have the right to retain 40 per cent of their total tax revenue, 40 per cent of which they 
retrocede to ETDs.26 On paper, the decentralization process thus marks a major breaking 
point with colonial and Mobutist centralized modes of governance. To overcome long-es-
tablished practices and habits of prefectural rule is, however, more easily said than done. 
Ever since its start in 2006, the process of decentralization has been accompanied by a 
persistent lack of planning and funding. Local and municipal elections have not yet been 
held. In their absence, ETD chiefs continue to be appointed by central government, calling 
into question their legitimacy and accountability for those they govern.27 A worrying lack 
of administrative capacity also remains at the local level. While central and provincial 
governments have set up divisions to strengthen that capacity, as well as to accompany 
and advise ETDs in the process of decentralization, these divisions likewise suffer from a 
lack of funding. Moreover, much of their time is spent trying to align donor programmes 
with central government strategy, and to reconcile the competing agendas of provincial 
ministries and government.28
Decentralization has disrupted existing governance structures in two important ways. 
First, a weak central state has been reproduced at the local level as ETDs are neither 
receiving nor raising sufficient means to provide better public services. At the same time, 
ETDs have enough autonomy to mimic the predatory practices of central government to 
find ways to live off the local population.29 The Congo has a long history of such débrouil-
25 They can, for example, call for extraordinary missions such as in case of demonstrations, 
strikes and riots. See: President’s Office, ‘Loi organique nr. 11/013 du 11 août portant 
organisation et fonctionnement de la Police Nationale Congolaise’, Article 17, Kinshasa, 2011 
(on file with author); Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo, ‘Loi organique 
n° 08/016 du 7 octobre 2008 portant composition, organisation et fonctionnement des Entités 
Décentralisées et leurs rapports avec l’État et les Provinces’, Kinshasa: Cabinet du Président de la 
République, 10 October 2008.
26 Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo, ‘Constitution’; Journal Officiel de 
la République Démocratique du Congo, ‘Loi des Entités Décentralisées’; Journal Officiel de la 
République Démocratique du Congo, ‘Loi subdivisions territoriales’; Cellule Technique d’Appui 
à la Décentralisation, ‘La décentralisation en bref’, 2013; Journal Officiel de la République 
Démocratique du Congo, ‘Loi n° 11/011 du 13 juillet 2011 relative aux finances publiques’, 52nd 
year, special number, 25 July 2011.
27 Joseph Hengelela Cihunda, ‘Decentralised Territorial Entities and Promotion of Local 
Governance under the Constitution of 18 February 2006 in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo’, in Decentralisation and Constitutionalism in Africa, eds. Charles M. Fombad and Nico 
Steytler, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, 365–383.
28 Interview with agent of South Kivu provincial division of decentralization, Bukavu, 3 July 
2019. 
29 Pierre Englebert, ‘Incertitude, autonomie et parasitisme: Les Entités Territoriales 
Décentralisées et l’État en République démocratique du Congo’, Politique Africaine 125 (2012): 
169–187; Pierre Englebert and Emmanuel Kasongo Mungongo, ‘Misguided and Misdiagnosed: 
The Failure of Decentralization Reforms in the DR Congo’, African Studies Review 59/1 (2016): 
5–32.
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lardise (improvisation): State officials making do with whatever is thrown at them.30 The 
process of decentralization is no exception. To some extent, local administrators have 
subverted the opportunities provided by decentralization for their own purposes. Second, 
the half-hearted implementation of decentralization has further complicated local secu-
rity governance. Some army and police officers seem reluctant to accept that lower-ranked 
administrators, such as sub-mayors, and the sector and chieftaincy chiefs, have a say in 
the maintenance of public order in their jurisdictions and can therefore call on them.31 
Inversely, some ETD chiefs, in particular customary chiefs, struggle to impose their newly 
acquired authority over state security forces.
In sum, in an attempt to bring government closer to its citizens, decentralization has 
turned the newly formed decentralized entities into additional sources of extraction 
without providing any meaningful public services in return. Patronage and state security 
governance have also been further fragmented and dispersed. In theory, police reform 
not only relies on these entities but similarly aims to bring the police closer to its citizens. 
Therefore, police reform and restructuring should shake up existing security governance 
logics and arrangements even further. 
Reforming the police
Since the 1990s, based on the assumption that good police–community relations rein-
force state legitimacy, community-oriented police reform has risen to become a central 
element in security sector reform and statebuilding.32 Implementing community policing 
models in conflict-affected and patronage-based states is beset by significant challenges. 
In the Congo, similar to decentralization, police reform threatens to disrupt existing secu-
rity governance in two fundamental ways. First, patronage structures—which incentivize 
revenue generation and the cultivation of personal loyalties—hamper the progress of 
community policing models. Police working for citizens instead of using them to extract 
resources threatens the flow of funds that keeps current police and government elites 
in power. Second, democratic and preventative policing principles are at odds with the 
repressive force needed to maintain regime security. This tension reflects a wider, global 
problem with security sector reform: All too often, it threatens the very foundations of 
30 This is derived from the meanings of (imaginary) Article 15 and the phrase débrouillez-vous 
(fend for yourself).
31 Nlandu, ‘Mapping Police Services’, 80.
32 Nematullah Bizhan, ‘Building legitimacy and state capacity in protracted fragility: The case 
of Afghanistan’, London and Oxford: Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, 
2018. Accessed 10 October 2018, https://www.theigc.org/publication/building-legitimacy-state-
capacity-protracted-fragility-case-afghanistan; Allegra Clare Schermuly, ‘Encounters between 
the police and the public: seize the day or practice avoidance?’, Journal of Criminological 
Research, Policy and Practice 4/2 (2018): 148–160; Philipp Rotmann, ‘First steps towards a 
police doctrine for UN peace operations (2001–2006)’, Policing and Society 21/1 (2011): 84–95; 
Nadine Ansorg, Felix Haass and Julia Strasheim, ‘Police reforms in peace agreements, 1975–2011: 
Introducing the PRPA dataset’, Journal of Peace Research 53/4 (2016): 597–607; Beth K. Greener, 
‘UNPOL: UN police as peacekeepers’, Policing & Society 19 (2009): 109–118.
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power of those responsible for implementing the reforms.33 Nonetheless, police reform in 
the Congo has had some successes.
Continued police reform aims to turn the Congolese police force into a Police de proximité 
based on a philosophy and working strategy that emphasizes police–community partner-
ship, accountability and preventative policing. From 2009 to its premature end in 2015, 
an ambitious donor programme in support of police reform, the GBP 60 million (USD 87 
million) Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform (SSAPR) programme funded by 
the UK Department for International Development (DFID), started implementing this vision 
in three pilot site cities: Matadi, Kananga and Bukavu. The SSAPR took a two-pronged 
approach, focusing both on the supply and demand sides of reform. It promoted insti-
tutional reform and capacity building at the highest level and simultaneously carried out 
large popular sensitization campaigns and established meeting and coordination plat-
forms between police, urban administrations and communities—the Conseil local pour la 
sécurité de proximité (CLSP, Local Council for Proximity Security) and Forums de quartier 
(FQ, Neighbourhood Forums).34
The CLSPs and FQs exist next to a much longer-standing security council, the Conseil local 
de sécurité (CLS, local security council). The CLS is not anchored in law. Rather, common 
practice since at least Mobutu has institutionalized it over time and made it the most 
important meeting platform for state security governance. The council tends to meet 
every two weeks. It can be called in at every administrative level—from the province 
down to the groupement. The council brings together all key security actors (army, police, 
intelligence and migration services) and is presided over by the relevant administrative 
authority. In contrast to the CLSP’s active engagement of civil society and a more human 
security oriented approach, the CLS deals with questions of state security and makes 
operational and intelligence decisions, which is why it is closed to the public. Since at 
least the 1990s, however, under pressure from an increasingly strong civil society in the 
years following the end of Mobutu’s one-party rule, some CLS meetings have consulted its 
representatives before taking decisions on matters of state security. Such largely ad hoc 
meetings are known as CLS élargi (CLSe, extended CLS). Importantly, the CLSe is a merely 
consultative meeting and, as with the CLS, is not rooted in law.35
On paper, the CLS, CLSe, CLSP, FQ and FG complement one another. The CLS deals with 
questions of state security and uses the CLSe to consult civilians, as well as to convey 
its decisions and operations to them. The CLSP, FQ and FG focus on human security and 
make community representatives equal partners in providing inclusive responses to local 
33 Michel Thill, Robert Njangala and Josaphat Musamba, ‘Putting everyday police life at the 
centre of reform’, London: Rift Valley Institute, 2018.
34 Interviews with senior SSAPR staff, Brussels, 18 March and 8 June 2016; Kinshasa, 13 and 14 
September 2016; Bukavu, 22 October 2016. Also see: Palladium, ‘Independent Evaluation of the 
Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme: Final Evaluation Report’, London: 
Palladium, 2015.
35 ‘Guide Pratique: Les Comités Provinciaux et locaux de sécurité et les Forums de Quartier’, 
Kinshasa, 27 February 2012 (on file with author).
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security concerns. SSAPR did manage to get them to work alongside one another and 
any other outside security governance interventions must familiarize themselves and 
their beneficiaries with these various platforms to avoid competition in purpose and over 
limited funds. 
While the initial ambition of the SSAPR was to continue for at least another five to ten 
years, and eventually extend its activities into rural areas, the project came to an abrupt 
end in 2015. Operation Likofi in the capital, Kinshasa, a campaign of brutal repression 
against youth gangs by the police force in 2013 and 2014, provoked international outcry 
over human rights abuses by the PNC. Although the SSAPR had not given support to the 
Kinshasa police—to the frustration of the PNC, DFID and SSAPR staff—the UK government 
Box 1: the clsp and fQ: success in the city
In order to create a framework for police–community encounters, police reform established 
two meeting platforms, the CLSP and the FQ. The CLSP sits at the level of ETDs (sectors, 
chieftaincies and municipalities but not cities). The CLSP aims to create a framework for 
regular dialogue between public actors and civil society to exchange information and expe-
rience on matters of human security or proximity security (Art. 1 and 2 of the 2012 CLSP de-
cree). The CLSP meets every trimester to prepare security diagnoses for its entity, develop a 
Plan local de sécurité (PLS, Local Security Plan) and decide on initiatives to prevent or ad-
dress local security risks. Such local security projects can use the ETD budget to take direct 
action on matters of local security. In 2013, the CLSP was anchored in law through a prime 
ministerial decree, which is one of the central achievements of the SSAPR. Importantly, the 
decree explicitly provides for the enactment of a provincial CLSP fund, to which donors and 
international NGOs can directly contribute to support CLSP activities.
The backbone of the CLSP are the FQs in cities and the Forums de groupement (FG, 
Grouping Forums) in rural areas. These monthly forums sit at the administrative level 
below municipalities, sectors and chieftaincies. They are chaired by the respective 
district and groupement chiefs and unite local police and communities. They feed the 
CLSP the information necessary to develop the PLS and keep it updated on the security 
concerns of the local population. During SSAPR, both CLSP and FQ meetings improved 
general knowledge of police work, helped overcome long-standing distrust between 
police and communities, fostered collaboration between them and ensured a modicum 
of accountability. Urban realities, however, are vastly different from those in rural areas. 
Implementing the CLSP decree outside the city is a serious challenge, with some coming 
to criticize it as a project conceptualized for cities, with few chances of succeeding in rural 
environments.  
Source: Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Décret CLSP.
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decided to shut down the programme.36 Its activities and successes thus remain limited to 
only three cities and the extension of the CLSP to rural areas slowed down considerably. 
With the national government pledging to reinvigorate police reform and with the provin-
cial government serious about establishing CLSPs across the province, plans for a CLSP 
extension into the countryside are again back on the agenda. The logics of governance that 
permeate DRC security institutions, however, stand in direct opposition to the ambitions 
of police reform. In the absence of a coherent security strategy in the countryside, rural 
administrators are forced to cope as best they can by governing security on a day-to-day 
basis. Kalehe and the chieftaincy of Buhavu provide insightful lessons into the realities and 
practices of local security governance in rural areas.
36 Bureau Conjoint des Nations Unies aux Droits de l’Homme, ‘Rapport du Bureau conjoint des 
Nations Unies aux Droits de l’Homme sur les violations des droits de l’homme commises par des 
agents de la Police Nationale Congolaise dans le cadre de l’opération “Likofi” à Kinshasa entre 
le 15 novembre 2013 et le 15 février 2014’, Kinshasa: MONUSCO, 2014. Accessed 4 October 
2019, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/LikofiReportOctober2014_fr.pdf; Steve 
Hopkins, ‘More than £50 million of British foreign aid was given to police in Congo despite 
reports they executed nine people including a child, Daily Mail, 28 November 2014. Accessed 
4 October 2019, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2853105/More-50million-British-
foreign-aid-given-police-Congo-despite-reports-executed-nine-people-including-child.html.
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Box 2: overview of Kalehe, Buhavu and Buzi
Situated in the north-east of South Kivu province in the eastern Congo and one of its eight 
territories, Kalehe covers more than 5,000 square kilometres and has around 815,000 
inhabitants. Kalehe neighbours the province of North Kivu, in particular the territories of 
Masisi and Walikale in the north, and borders Lake Kivu in the east, the territory of Kabare 
in the south and Shabunda, the largest territory in South Kivu, in the west. The Kahuzi-
Biega National Park edges all of the border with Shabunda and parts of the boundary with 
Kabare. Flora and fauna in Kalehe are remarkably diverse. From the beaches of Lake Kivu 
in the east, it stretches up to the Moyens and Hauts Plateaux (Middle and High Mountain 
Ranges), the peaks of which reach 2,500 metres. From there, a long formation of valleys 
and hills descend and ascend to eventually reach the edges of the national park in the west 
and south. 
Kalehe is divided into two chieftaincies, Buhavu and Buloho, each led by a mwami 
(customary chief). Buhavu extends from the shores of Lake Kivu to the national park in the 
west, and embraces the much smaller Buloho in its centre. Buhavu soil is incredibly rich, 
both for agriculture and with minerals. The chieftaincy covers more than 3,500 square 
kilometres. It is home to between 650,000 and 700,000 people, the majority of whom 
are from the Havu ethnic community, followed by Tembo, Rongeronge, Hutu and Tutsi. 
According to the 2019 local development plan of the chieftaincy, its people live off less 
than USD 30 per month and only around 3 per cent have access to electricity. 
Buhavu is divided into seven groupements with Buzi, where the field research for this 
report took place, being one of them. Buzi consists of 13 villages, which neighbour the 
North Kivu Masisi territory in the north and the Kalehe Mbinga-Nord groupement in 
the south. In the east, the Bulenga peninsula stretches into Lake Kivu and in the west, it 
extends up to the Hauts Plateaux, where it shares a border with the Ziralo groupement. 
The main urban centre in Buzi is Minova, which is the largest urban area in Kalehe. Minova 
is also the seat of the territorial police headquarters and a chef de poste (post chief), who 
reports directly to the administrateur territorial (AT, territorial administrator). Both the 
mwami and the AT, along with the central government institutions of the territory and the 
secretariat of the customary chief, reside in the chef-lieu (county seat) of the territory, 
Kalehe centre, roughly 90 km to the south of Minova.
Similar to Kalehe as a whole, Buzi has diverse landscapes (from beaches to mountains), 
a variety of economies (from the fishing villages in Bulenga and Kasunyu to the mines 
and cattle herding in the Moyens and Hauts Plateaux) and is home to both villages and 
urban centres. Its security challenges range from rapid urban growth in Minova via armed 
robberies of fisher folk on Lake Kivu to land conflicts, ethnic tensions and active armed 
groups in the Hauts Pleateaux. 
Source: Chieftaincy of Buhavu, ‘Plan de développement local de la Chefferie de Buhavu 2019–
2023’, March 2010 (on file with author); Kalehe territory, ‘Plan d’action de sécurité: Territoire de 
Kalehe’, January 2019 (on file with author); Action pour la Paix et la Concorde,‘Conflits fonciers et 
dynamiques de cohabitation en territoire de Kalehe, Sud-Kivu, est de la RDC’, Bukavu: Life & Peace 
Institute, 2012; interview with members of fishing association, Kasunyu, 12 July 2019; interview with 
Kalehe expert, Bukavu, 19 July 2019.
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4. Governing local security in Kalehe 
As an administrative entity, Kalehe faces no shortage of challenges: A lack of infrastruc-
ture, inaccessibility and land conflicts; stark poverty, high unemployment and sparse 
public services; ill equipped, badly trained and barely paid security forces; and armed 
groups replacing state actors not only in governing security, but also in levying taxes.37 To 
complicate matters, administrative authorities find themselves in a tug-of-war over who 
is responsible for state security and civil society spends much of their time infighting. In 
such a context, administrators, customary chiefs, police and soldiers rely on community 
leaders and village dignitaries to join efforts to guarantee a measure of security. 
policing rural Kalehe
Policing Kalehe is a considerable task. On the Hauts Plateaux of Buhavu, in the much 
contested cinq collines (five hills),38 not 20 km from Numbi, the largely Hutu Nyatura 
armed group controls Lumbishi and stretches of surrounding land. Much of the neigh-
bouring Ziralo groupement is under the influence of Mai Mai Kirikicho, headquartered at 
Tushunguti. The Mai Mai Kirikicho once again have become a powerful force. An excep-
tion is the village of Chambombo, 25 kilometres west of Numbi, which is in the hands 
of the Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie (CNRD, National Council for 
Renewal and Democracy), a splinter group of the Forces démocratiques pour la libération 
du Rwanda (FDLR, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda), a Hutu armed group, 
the origins of which date back to the Rwandan genocide and its spill over in to the eastern 
DRC.39
37 Hoffmann et al., ‘Taxation, stateness and armed groups’; Koen Vlassenroot, Emery 
Mushagalusa Mudinga and Kasper Hoffmann, ‘Contesting Authority: Armed rebellion and 
military fragmentation in Walikale and Kalehe, North and South Kivu’, London: Rift Valley 
Institute, 2016; Kasper Hoffman and Koen Vlassenroot, ‘Armed groups and the exercise of public 
authority: the cases of the Mayi-Mayi and Raya Mutomboki in Kalehe, South Kivu’, Peacebuilding 
2/2 (2014).
38 See Box 3. Emery Mushagalusa Mudinga, ‘Les conflits fonciers à l'Est de la RDC: au-delà de 
la confrontation entre rwandophones et autochtones à Kalehe’, in L'Afrique des Grands Lacs: 
Annuaire 2012–2013, eds. Filip Reyntjens, Stefan Vandeginste and Marije Verpoorten, Paris: 
Harmattan, 2013: 195–218.
39 Since the time of writing, a major army offensive against the CNRD was launched in Kalehe, 
which led to considerable displacements of combatants as well as communities.
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Armed groups are the central threat to security in three of four security priority zones 
highlighted by the Kalehe 2019 Plan d’action de sécurité (PAS, Security Action Plan).40 A 
police officer in Numbi puts it plainly: ‘It is them who rule over there. They manage the 
population over there. In Lumbishi, no state services exist anymore.’41 He goes on to say 
that ‘weapons circulate a bit everywhere’ and that ‘for us, the police, it has become impos-
sible to work properly’. He explains that to detain a suspect in Shanje and return them to 
Numbi, a mere 7 km away, is currently much too risky due to the threat of surprise attacks 
by armed elements on the way back. Moreover, for police to stand up to armed groups 
and their leaders, such as self-declared General Kirikicho, is no easy feat: ‘A policeman 
with the rank of a commissioner or deputy commissioner [the army equivalent of lieu-
tenant and sub-lieutenant] has nothing to say in front of Kirikicho. It is he who governs 
over there.’ In the Congo, dealing with armed groups is not the task of the police but that 
of the army. As police and civilians alike point out, the most important security actor in 
Kalehe is the army, even if they also struggle to keep armed group activity at bay.42 The 
only security zone where armed groups do not operate is Lake Kivu’s coastline. Nonethe-
less, even in this area, where land conflicts, armed theft, the sale of drugs and hard liquor, 
and police and army harassment prevail, armed group recruitment and the illegal circula-
tion of guns still pose a threat. 
In Kalehe, distances are long. As a civil society representative puts it, ‘Kalehe is a coun-
try.’43 These challenges are worsened by decayed infrastructure, further complicating the 
work of both the army and police. The 50 km road from Minova up to Numbi, for example, 
is only practical by motorbike or by foot during the rainy season. The spread of the seats 
of key authorities and security actors adds to these complications. The court and state 
attorney are in Kalehe-centre, along with the territorial administrator and the chieftaincy 
secretariat. The territorial police commissariat, however, is in Minova, 90 km away. The 
Tribunal de grande instance (regional court), which has jurisdiction over cases of sexual 
violence, is even further away in Kavumu, close to Bukavu. 
Add to this the dismal working conditions of the police in rural areas. A police officer 
in Numbi complains: ‘We have absolutely nothing, not even handcuffs. The equipment I 
have is the uniform, a beret and boots.’44 A colleague in Minova echoes his sentiments: 
40 Kalehe territorial administration, ‘Plan d’Action de Sécurité’, January 2019; Grouping of 
Buzi, ‘Rapport du forum de groupement de Buzi organisé dans le cadre du diagnostic local 
et participative de sécurité’, draft, no date; Grouping of Mbinga-Nord, ‘Rapport du forum de 
groupement de Mbinga-Nord organisé dans le cadre du diagnostic local et participative de 
sécurité’, April 2018; Grouping of Mbinga-Sud, ‘Rapport du forum de groupement de Mbinga-Sud 
organisé dans le cadre du diagnostic local et participative de sécurité’, April 2018. All reports on 
file with author.
41 Interview with two police officers, Numbi, 11 July 2019. The remaining quotes in this 
paragraph are also derived from this source.
42 Interview with civil society member, Numbi, 11 July 2019; interview with Kalehe expert, 
Bukavu, 19 July 2019.
43 Interview with civil society member, Minova, 10 July 2019.
44 Interview with two police officers, Numbi, 11 July 2019.
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‘Here, we have zero cars, zero motorbikes, zero walkie-talkies, zero equipment.’45 When 
asked about the police budget, he adds: ‘That doesn’t even exist. Challenge number one 
is the budget.’ Minova police officers also feel that they are treated less well than their 
colleagues in cities who, according to them, receive transport money, cars and motor-
bikes. When a donor does hand over a jeep to the Kalehe police, it quickly disappears only 
to show up at a Bukavu police station.46 As a police officer explains, the security of political 
elites trumps collective security in the Congo. He pointedly asks, ‘How many police cars 
are in the governor’s motorcade? Provincial members of parliament scold the police [for 
not properly doing their job] but are happy to have at least three protecting them. As the 
same police officer remarks, ‘Then they wonder that we do not have the numbers [to do 
our job].’47 He concludes by saying: ‘It is a national disease. They have to be put back in 
school, the whole political class, the school of security governance.’ Even if they were well 
equipped, the Kalehe police would not have the numbers necessary to go about their 
work effectively, let alone implement proximity police principles. The Ziralo groupement, 
for example, has 10 police for a population of around 30,000.48 A police officer in Minova 
explains that a territorial commissariat should have 279 elements, ‘But today, we are 22 
police. Instead of 279, we are 22 police.’49
These are some of the factors that shape current police practices in Buzi, which include the 
detention of suspects beyond the 48-hour limit, requests that detainees or complainants 
pay for transport and the harassment of civilians. One police officer provides a succinct 
overview of the situation:
Yes, there was once a problem between two school rectors who fought over who 
would direct the school. A police intervention was needed and we judged that it 
would be good for us to spend a whole week in that village for security reasons. 
But now, who would put up these policemen? This caused us much trouble. 
Every day, they called us [those who remained back in the station] that they were 
hungry, that they were not eating. We went to see the local administrator, who 
said he was deconcentrated [déconcentré] and that the police also need to partic-
ipate in their provisioning … We went to see the groupement chief, who also 
could not help us and said we needed to improvise. So, by saying that we need to 
improvise [se débrouiller], that means either harassment or theft. And that’s how 
the police fail in their mission. The police who are meant to protect the popula-
tion, they become aggressive against this very population.
45 Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019. The following quote is also derived from 
this source.
46 Participants in focus group with police officers, Minova, 8 July 2019.
47 Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019. The following quotes are also derived from 
this source.
48 Kalehe territorial administration, ‘Plan d’Action de Sécurité’, January 2019 (on file with 
author).
49 Participant in focus group with police officers, Minova, 8 July 2019.
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Without adequate means and human resources, police reform and its principles of prox-
imity in rural areas are put to a serious test. A police officer sums up: ‘[A police] mission 
equals means’.50 A local administrator concurs, ‘Security without means is always diffi-
cult.’51 At the heart of local security governance in Kalehe, then, is the question of who is 
responsible for financing security.
Taking responsibility for local security 
As ETDs, chieftaincies enjoy budgetary autonomy and have a range of new responsibilities. 
The mwami, for example, wears two hats, one as the traditional chief and one as relatively 
autonomous administrator. In other words, this means that the mwami is responsible for 
organizing and co-financing security in that administrative territory, playing an active role 
in security governance. Some chiefs are very active.52 Others, however, are more reluc-
tant and limit their activities to the socio-economic development of their entities.53 Some 
customary chiefs are also young and inexperienced. They prefer not to be involved in the 
everyday matters of running their chieftaincy, instead entrusting this to their teams. They 
may lack the required gravitas, perhaps even confidence, to request meetings with high-
ranking police and army officers in their administrative territory to talk security. An agent 
of the South Kivu division for decentralization cautiously explains that chiefs ‘are not yet 
conscious of their responsibilities’.54
How much of a role a customary chief plays in relation to local security is thus also a ques-
tion of individual leadership. In the case of Buhavu, for example, a civil society member 
complains that ‘there is not even a Conseil de sécurité [security council] at the chieftaincy 
level.’55 This lack of will makes it difficult to establish a CLSP. In fact, an international 
consortium involved in security governance decided to skip the chieftaincy in the elabo-
ration of a Plan local de sécurité (PLS, Local Security Plan, situated at the ETD level) and 
instead worked with the territorial administration. With consortium support, the terri-
torial administration drafted a Plan d’action de sécurité (PAS, Security Action Plan), the 
implementation of which, however, will be challenging without the proactive involvement 
of the chieftaincy. 
50 Interview with police officer, Minova, 10 July 2019.
51 Interview with agent of territorial administration, Kalehe-centre, 11 July 2019.
52 For Kalehe’s Buholo chieftaincy for example, see: Hoffmann et al., ‘Taxation, stateness and 
armed groups’.
53 Interview with member of faith organization, Minova, 10 July 2019.
54 Interview with agent of decentralization division, Bukavu, 3 July 2019. ETDs struggle in 
general to cope with their new competences. This is reflected in the fact that, by June 2019, 
only 5 out of 27 EDTs in South Kivu had submitted their budget for the running financial year 
starting on 1 January 2019. Interview with civil society member and agent of the Bukavu urban 
administration, Kalungu, 8 July 2019.
55 Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019.
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Much actual decision-making in security governance remains situated at the level of the 
entités territoriales déconcentrées (deconcentrated territorial entities), which are not 
decentralized and thus remain executive bodies of the central administration and its 
policies, financially dependent on the latter and without legal personality of their own. 
Deconcentrated entities are the urban neighbourhoods, villages, groupings and territo-
ries. Security meetings, commonly referred to as CLSs, also tend to take place at these 
levels, and particularly so at the territorial level. Deconcentrated entities, however, often 
do not have the means to fund CLS meetings or to operationalize any urgent decisions 
taken in them. If operational costs are not forthcoming, territorial administrators and 
groupement chiefs need to either call on ETDs or rely on their improvisation skills. Here, 
then, lies a central conundrum of security governance and decentralization in rural areas: 
Those who have the means to invest in security do not always have the habit nor clout 
to do so; and those who are de facto managing security and do have the required experi-
ence, lack the funds for it. 
In the case of Kalehe and Buhavu, this reality is the source of much frustration on all sides. 
A representative of the territorial administration puts the problem bluntly: ‘For the chief-
taincies [Buhavu and Buloho], for matters of security, they don’t care. They are customary 
chiefs. But they forget that they wear two hats—a customary one and that of an agent 
of the state.’56 One of his colleagues in the enclaved Hauts Plateaux adds: ‘Normally, the 
chieftaincy ought to take charge of security. If it was conscientious, it could always support 
security.’57 He goes on to argue that because the chieftaincy loses taxes from markets and 
cattle ranchers due to armed group activity, it harms itself by not investing in security: ‘It 
is as if it has failed in its mission’ because, after all, ‘all development [which the chieftaincy 
claims to focus on] starts with security’. 
At the same time, the deconcentrated entities all too often bypass the chieftaincy in 
matters of security, thus making it difficult for chieftaincy actors to play a more active role. 
The chefs de poste (post chiefs) in Numbi and Minova, for example, do not always feel it 
necessary to report to the mwami; they are appointed by the territorial administrator and 
that is the person to whom they report.58
Army and police representatives also confirm the limited role of the chieftaincy in secu-
rity governance. Deployed in Kalehe since October 2016, an army commander insists that 
relations with the chief were good but then goes on to say: ‘The mwami has never called 
me but if he did, we have to go because he is a mwami.’59 While the Buhavu customary 
chief thus has a degree of authority, he rarely seems to use this in relation to security 
matters. The police are much more explicit in their observations. As one police officer 
states: ‘The chieftaincy has not understood decentralization. It does not contribute to 
56 Interview with agent of territorial administration, Kalehe-centre, 4 July 2019.
57 Interview with agent of territorial administration, Kalehe-centre, 11 July 2019.
58 Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 6 July 2019; interview with territorial 
administrators, Kalehe, 6 and 11 July 2019.
59 Interview with senior army officer, 9 July 2019.
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the financing of the PNC, although everywhere else in the world, municipalities and cities 
do so.’60 Another police officer concisely sums up: ‘The chieftaincy does nothing for us.’61
While many point accusing fingers at the chieftaincy, its members argue that the respon-
sibility for state security lies first and foremost with the central government and its 
decentralized entities. In their view, their main responsibility lies in the socio-economic 
development of their entity. Understandably, ‘the chieftaincy cannot do everything at the 
same time’.62 This comment reflects reality but simultaneously reveals general misunder-
standing about the shared responsibilities the ETD chief has in matters of security. It also 
demonstrates a specific misunderstanding of the notion of human security that underpins 
police reform efforts, whereby local authorities, communities and development play a 
crucial role. 
A second argument chieftaincy members put forward is that the authorities of deconcen-
trated entities want part of the already insufficient ETD budget to cover the costs of their 
own security meetings. In part, this budget shortfall is due to the lack of retrocession of 
taxes from the province and central government. In theory, around 42 per cent of the 
chieftaincy budget should be financed by the province and around 16 per cent should 
come from Kinshasa. According to an in-year report on the implementation of the 2018 
national budget, by June that year, central government had sent less than 60 per cent of 
its mandated retrocession to the provinces and ETDs.63 The province does not seem to 
retrocede at all, leaving a large gap in the chieftaincy budget. According to a chieftaincy 
member, since the start of decentralization in 2008–09, the province of South Kivu has 
in fact never retroceded any money back to Buhavu.64 A third challenge identified by the 
chieftaincy is what Buhavu representatives call ‘incivisme fiscal’, a lack of civic duty. Too 
many residents, commercial enterprises and companies dodge taxes, and tax collectors all 
too often keep part of what they collect for themselves.
Despite budgetary shortfalls, the chieftaincy does cover security costs from time to time. 
With its first autonomous budget, for example, the chieftaincy paid for walkie-talkies for 
all state security actors. While their current revenue does not allow for such expenses 
anymore, they still reportedly cover CLS participation costs from time to time, despite 
the lack of any prior agreement on an appropriate budget and not being informed by the 
territorial administration about meetings. A participant in a CLS meeting offers a telling 
example. At the end of the meeting, participants who had come from afar raised their 
60 Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019.
61 Interview with police officer, Numbi, 11 July 2019.
62 Interview with civil society member, 8 July 2019, Kalungu.
63 Ministry of Budget, ‘Commentaires sur les états de suivi budgétaire à fin juin 2018 (situation 
provisoire)’, Kinshasa: Ministry of Budget, 9 July 2018. Accessed 4 October 2019, https://www.
cabri-sbo.org/en/documents/comments-on-the-monitoring-statements-budget-at-the-end-of-
june-2018.
64 Interview with two agents of the chieftaincy, Kalehe-centre, 13 July 2019. The following 
quote is also derived from this source.
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hands and asked: ‘But now that we have finished, what do we do [to get back home]?’65 
Contradicting chieftaincy claims, the CLS meeting participant goes on to explain that all 
too often, ‘everybody has to pay from their own pocket’. He adds, ‘Can you imagine an 
army colonel from Bunyakiri [around 150 km from Kalehe-centre] who comes on a motor-
bike? It’s a disgrace!’ Nevertheless, chieftaincy members insist that they contribute in 
such cases, doing so because of their sense of patriotism and solidarity: ‘We intervene 
everywhere because we are here. We tell ourselves that the population cannot continue 
to suffer.’66
In sum, security interventions cost money, which both deconcentrated and decentralized 
authorities claim not to have. In a focus group discussion, one police officer succinctly 
accuses all sides including that of the police for not taking up their responsibilities:
I represent the police, and there are also the authorities and the population. That 
is, there is a triangle, a space of interaction. Everybody has to play their role. But 
you will find that there is no real interaction, and the authorities do not play their 
role for the security service. And the police have difficulties doing their work for 
the population because they are not equipped, and the population doesn’t really 
trust its police much because the police doesn’t have the means to do their work 
for the population. And so this triangle is not really effective. The authorities 
don’t play their role and the police, although they could play their role, have diffi-
culties doing so, and the population lack trust.67
Another police officer, sceptical about the level of chieftaincy support for local security, 
directly asks: ‘Is there even a line for security in the chieftaincy budget?’68 Considering 
that both deconcentrated and decentralized territorial administrators claim to have no 
means, it is worth exploring how an ETD such as Buhavu budgets for security. 
Budgeting for local security 
Decentralization has had a direct impact on public finances and budgeting exercises in 
the DRC. There are now three kinds of budgets: ETD budgets, which are integrated into 
budgets provinciaux (provincial budgets); in turn, provincial budgets are integrated into 
the budget from the pouvoir central (central government) to make up the budget de 
l’état (state budget). To facilitate this process of upward integration, the central govern-
ment fixes budget categories, lines and items through which national, provincial and ETD 
65 Interview with CLS participant, Kalehe-centre, 4 July 2019. The following quotes are also 
derived from this source.
66 Interview with two agents of the chieftaincy, Kalehe-centre, 13 July 2019.
67 Participant in focus group with police officers, Minova, 8 July 2019. The following quote is 
also derived from this source.
68 Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019.
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budgets are organized. This template is then filled in by the respective authorities at the 
decentralized levels according to their expected revenues and expenses.69
Local security matters do not have a specific budget line but security-related expenses 
do show up more indirectly. The Buhavu 2019 budget amounts to a little less than USD 
2 million, of which the chieftaincy aims to contribute 42 per cent (approximately USD 
800,000). Current expenditure makes up half of the total budget or USD 1 million.70 Its 
second largest sub-category is service expenditure (dépenses de prestations), which 
is slightly less than 30 per cent of that (approximately USD 290,000). Security-related 
expenses appear here. A first appearance of such expenses is listed under the transport 
expenses sub-sub-category, which represents 5.7 per cent of the overall service expen-
diture. The budget item for rental and chartering of means of transport dedicates USD 
7,400 (45 per cent of total transport expenses) to car rentals for chieftaincy staff, which is 
explicitly justified by their need to attend CLS meetings.
A second much more intriguing budget item is 5-6131, referring to Fonds secrets de 
recherche (FSR, Secret Research Fund), which is tucked away under the sub-category 
labelled as ‘other services’. It totals roughly USD 150,000, or more than half of the total 
service expenditure category under which it sits, and making up approximately 16 per 
cent of the total current expenditure in Buhavu. This is a considerable amount. An explan-
atory note breaks down the FSR into three specific categories: Civil investigation; justice; 
and other surveillance (autres filatures), which is endowed with USD 65,000 (around 42 
per cent of the total). The budget note explains:
The expenditure related to this category concerns research, investigation and 
other surveillance actions led by civil, military, and security and justice services. 
There is much turmoil caused by armed groups in the Buhavu chieftaincy to the 
extent that surveillance and investigation actions are indispensable in order to try 
and reduce new actions by anticipating their movements.71
According to chieftaincy staff, the FSR covers the organization cost of CLS meetings.72 
Looking at the USD 150,000 per year (USD 12,500 per month) FSR budget, however, it 
is difficult to argue that the chieftaincy does not have sufficient funds to support local 
security matters—even when taking into account the absence of retrocession and the 
challenges in local tax collection. While the FSR has the potential and flexibility to be used 
to fund local security, two obstacles remain. First, without retrocession and with feeble 
tax collection, this budget line will likely be cut in half if not more, somewhat limiting that 
69 Journal Officiel, ‘Loi relative aux finances publiques’, Nomenclature budgétaire de la 
République Démocratique du Congo, Nomenclature des dépenses, Édition 2015, (on file with 
author).
70 Chieftaincy of Buhavu, Budgetary decision Nr 33 from 31 December 2018 for the 2019 
exercise, Kalehe, December 2018; and Chieftaincy of Buhavu, ‘Expenditure part: Budget 2019’, 
Buhavu: Chieftaincy of Buhavu, no date (on file with author).
71 Chieftaincy of Buhavu, ‘Expenditure part: Budget 2019’, 79.
72 Interview with two agents of the chieftaincy, Kalehe-centre, 13 July 2019.
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potential and providing the chieftaincy with a ready excuse. Second and more impor-
tantly, as long as the chieftaincy considers matters of local security to be the responsibility 
of the central state and its deconcentrated entities, it is unlikely that it will ever prioritize 
police support or local security projects. 
Civil society could play an important role in demanding more financial accountability and 
transparency in matters of public finance, in particular asking the chieftaincy to repriori-
tize how it spends its FSR budget. Civil society representatives, however, find it difficult to 
speak with one voice. 
fragmented civil society in Buzi
Civil society in the Congo has a history of being politicized either because its organizations 
have been substitutes for political mobilization and expression or because the state has 
actively tried to subsume them. Given that the Belgian Congo suppressed political parties 
almost up to its end, Congolese political engagement from the 1950s onward occurred 
largely through associations with an ostensibly non-political cause such as ethnic support 
networks, which eventually did turn into political parties. Mobutu’s one-party state also 
clamped down on political mobilization, leaving faith and civil society organizations as the 
only viable recourse for political expression. Concerned about their potential for resis-
tance, Mobutu responded with a mixed and changing strategy of coercion, oppression 
and co-optation.73 
This politicization has rendered civil society as an active battleground for everyday poli-
tics, as well as a springboard into political life. Political cleavages thus run through civil 
society and have led to fragmentation. In South Kivu, for example, at least four associ-
ations compete to function as an umbrella for all civil society organizations, with some 
having political backers who pull strings outside the public eye. Civil society remains an 
indispensable partner for central and local government, and the security services, because 
its members play an important role in sensitizing communities, relaying government and 
administrative decisions back to them, and in influencing their perceptions of a given 
government action or policy. In the realm of local security matters, civil society in Buzi 
well illustrates such interactions and the consequences of their fragmentation.
Outside the CLSe, the role of Buzi civil society is largely limited to informal interactions 
with authorities and security actors. In the words of a civil society representative, ‘We 
cross paths on the same road.’74 If such exchanges are deemed insufficient to address 
security concerns, civil society reverts to more confrontational approaches to make its 
voice heard. As a civil society member puts it: ‘Civil society does not take the time to 
73  See Schatzberg, Dialectics of Oppression, 115–134, for the case of religious groups; Young 
and Turner, Rise and Decline, 138–163. 
74  Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe centre, 6 July 2019; interview with member of 
civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019
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meet around a table and then approach authorities.’75 To the frustration of many security 
actors, for example, civil society is known to publicly call out grievances such as army road 
blocks, excessive taxes or police abuse via social media or local radio to put pressure on 
authorities to act. As another civil society representative explains, ‘When talking, they 
understand. But when acting, there is no change. … Authorities are like motorbikes. You 
have to kick start them.’76
The fragmented nature of civil society complicates a coherent and permanent exchange 
with security actors. It is common for umbrella organizations to hold their own gatherings 
to discuss local security, draw up lists of grievances and priorities, and then send their own 
delegation to the police to present these. The police find this frustrating, as they spend time 
meeting with various organizations claiming to represent the same communities. During 
elections, each umbrella organization verbally attacks the security services—regardless of 
actual justification—to score quick points with their own electorate. One irritated police 
officer, for example, claims that a civil society leader recently argued that to avoid traffic 
police harassment, the automobile association, and not the police, should manage car 
accidents; he goes on to explain that the leader likely did so to gain the support of this 
very influential association but, in the eyes of the police, this merely shows that ‘They [civil 
society actors] are hyper ignorant.’77  Another police officer adds: ‘Civil society tells the 
population that the police are their enemy. We, however, are like fish in the water and the 
population is our sea. But we are fish who have to live in that sea.’78 
Civil society fragmentation, combined with an often uncoordinated and confrontational 
approach to engaging the authorities and security services, complicates rapprochement, 
which is central to the ambitions of both decentralization and police reform. While tugs-
of-war between the administration and chieftaincy continue, and while civil society 
organizations battle one another and the police, insecurity in Kalehe endures. In the 
absence of a more coordinated response from the national and provincial authorities, 
local administrators, police and community leaders make do as best they can.  
Coping with insecurity
In the face of authorities that avoid responsibility and in the absence of sufficient budgets, 
it is difficult to find sustainable solutions to insecurity. If specific grievances remain unad-
dressed over time, particularly harassment and abuse by the security services, civil society 
leaders tend to resort to calls for auto-prise en charge (to take care of oneself). At a civil 
society meeting on security, for example, a civil society representative suggests a step-
by-step plan of escalation: First, they would give their list of grievances to the authorities 
75  Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 6 July 2019.
76  Interview with member of civil society, Kaleh- centre, 5 July 2019. The following quote is also 
derived from this source.
77  Interview with police officer, Minova, 9 July 2019.
78  Participant in focus group with police officers, Minova, 8 July 2019.
GoverninG local security in the eastern conGo 33
Box 3: Major fault lines in the history of Buzi
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Buzi groupement has sought more 
independence from the chieftaincy of Buhavu. Over time, these efforts have met with 
successes and failures. They have also triggered tension and conflict, which continue to 
impact civil society in Buzi and Buhavu in 2019. Understanding this history is of paramount 
importance for grasping the stakes at play in the realm of security governance. 
In the late nineteenth century, Rwandan King Kigeli IV Rwabugiri (1853–1895) conducted 
several military excursions in the Kivus, including the neighbouring Buhavu chieftaincy. 
To settle the conflict, Ntale, the Buhavu mwami, offered his son, Hubert Sangara, as 
war booty to Rwabugiri. Ntale expected the Rwandan king to kill his son but he instead 
raised him as his own. Once a young man, Sangara was allowed to return to Buhavu. To 
make peace with his son, Ntale gave him the Bulenga peninsula to rule as his own. Under 
Sangara’s leadership, Buzi slowly emerged as an entity of its own, with the people from 
Bulenga and their autonomous spirit at its heart. 
The Belgian colonizers liked Sangara, who knew how to exploit this relationship for 
business and political benefit. Such was Sangara’s influence that after independence in 
1968, Buzi annexed neighbouring Ziralo to form the Buzi–Ziralo groupement. For the next 
ten years, Sangara pursued a policy of land occupation to strengthen his claim over the 
largely unoccupied borderlands between both groupements on the Hauts Plateaux by 
granting lands to Hutu and Tutsi communities. They settled there and paid him royalties, 
and remain loyal to Buzi up to the present. Ziralo (which regained autonomy in 1978), 
however, claims a stretch of this borderland that remains strongly contested up to this 
day. This contested borderland is a mineral-rich zone comprised of Numbi, Lumbishi, 
Luzirandaka, Ngandjo and Shanje, referred to as the cinq collines (five hills). This conflict 
is directly linked to long-standing tensions over territory, authority and access to power 
between the Havu and Tembo, the former having been historically favoured by the 
colonizers at the expense of the latter. 
The same Rwandophone community, which now forms the majority on the Hauts Plateaux 
due to Sangara’s settlement plans, nevertheless feels marginalized at the territorial level 
because they do not have any effective administrative power beyond the village level. 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, political debates around Congolese citizenship risked 
undermining community claims to this territory and triggered calls of armed mobilization 
by Hutu communities to protect their lands. These grievances around land, identity and 
citizenship add another layer of complexity to Buzi. In this already opaque context, the 
and the police; and second, ‘If the police do nothing, we the people, we will take care of 
ourselves.’79 In the context of the DRC, this phrase is often understood as taking justice 
into one’s own hands. Criticizing this practice, a police officer asserts that, ‘taking care of 
oneself in the Congo means killing everyone and setting police stations on fire.’80
79  Participant in civil society security meeting held in Minova, 9 July 2019. 
80  Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019.
rift valley institute and vnG international report 34
In rural areas, communities have little choice but to organize themselves outside offi-
cial security channels. It is here that village and groupement chiefs play active roles in 
attempts to protect their own. Such efforts can consist of mobilizing youth patrols at 
night, organizing their own militias, involving the nearest army unit in their protection or 
making tenuous pacts with existing armed groups. Involving the army or existing armed 
groups, however, is a double-edged sword and has potential to backfire.81 If insecurity 
(such as armed robberies) goes unabated despite calls for help, communities may resort 
to justice populaire (popular justice), the act of beating to death thieves caught in the act 
or burning them alive. This practice is widely spread across the eastern DRC, especially in 
rural areas, where police are few and far between. A Bukavu-based human rights organi-
zation monitoring incidents of insecurity recorded 36 such cases in 2018.82 In the Kalehe 
Mbinga-Sud groupement, for example, armed burglars targeted the village of Kasheke 
over a few months in 2019 but despite calls by the villagers for the police or army to inter-
vene, nothing happened.83 In early July, the villagers captured two of the burglars and 
81  Judith Verweijen, ‘Military business and the business of the military in the Kivus’, Review of 
African Political Economy 40/135 (2013); Maria Eriksson Baaz and Judith Verweijen, ‘Arbiters with 
guns: the ambiguity of military involvement in civilian disputes in the DR Congo’, Third World 
Quarterly 35/5; Vlassenroot et al., ‘Contesting Authority’; Oxfam, ‘In the Balance: Searching for 
Protection in eastern DRC’, Oxfam Briefing Paper 179, 27 January 2014. Accessed 4 October 2019, 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/oxfam-us/www/static/media/files/bp-in-the-balance-protection-
eastern-drc-270114-en.pdf. 
82  Synergie des associations des jeunes pour l’éducation civique et électorale et la promotion 
des droits de l’homme au Sud-Kivu-Forces Vives, ‘Sud-Kivu 2018: 345 personnes tuées, 
881maisons attaquées par des bandits armés, 232 cas d’enlèvement et 36 cas de justice 
populaire en une seule année’, SAJECEK Bulletin Nr. 60, Bukavu: SAJECEK, 23 January 2019.
83  Interview with member of judiciary, Kalehe-centre, 4 July 2019; interview with member of 
civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019. Subsequent information in this paragraph is derived 
from these sources.
Rwandan civil war and 1994 genocide spilled into the eastern Congo, followed by the First 
(1996–1997) and Second (1998–2003) Congo Wars. 
The occupation of much of the eastern Congo by Rwandan and Ugandan-backed armed 
groups aggravated existing fault lines between Rwandophones and autochtonous 
communities. To garner local legitimacy, the occupiers backed various local movements 
calling for more autonomy. In 1999, they incorporated the villages of Lowa-Numbi on the 
Hauts Plateaux into the Mianzi groupement, headed by a Tutsi chief. Buzi also received the 
long sought status of chefferie, headed by Sangara’s son, Raymond Sangara Bera, further 
complicating the relationship between Buzi and Buhavu. Although Buzi is once again a 
groupement (since 2003), tensions still persist. 
Source: Action pour la Paix et la Concorde, ‘Analayse de context du territoire de Kalehe’, Bukavu: 
Life and Peace Institute, 2009; Kasper Hoffman, ‘Ethnogovernmentality: The Making of Ethnic 
Territories and Subjects in Eastern Congo’, PhD thesis, Roskilde University, Copenhagen, 2014; 
interview with Kalehe expert, Bukavu, 19 July 2019.
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killed them on the spot. It was only after this that civil society organizations, the territorial 
administration and security services went to Kasheke to calm the situation and organize 
a CLSe.
More commonly, however, communities work together with their local administrators to 
find solutions to the most urgent questions of insecurity. This was the case when the 
Nyatura armed group captured the village of Lumbishi on the Hauts Plateaux, during 
which several civilians lost their lives. The combatants did not bury them, which angered 
the villagers. The local administrator in Numbi convened community leaders and digni-
taries in Lumbishi and Numbi to find a solution. They eventually agreed to contribute 
to transportation costs, which allowed the security services to evacuate the dead from 
Lumbishi. The administrator describes the contribution of the dignitaries as ‘a sacrifice, 
it is patriotism’, going on to explain that village chiefs become crucial intermediaries in 
these situations because they often have relations with members of armed groups and 
can therefore mediate between them and the affected communities or talk to the parents 
of combatants to convince them to demobilize. 84 This, the administrator says, would not 
be possible for state actors because they could get arrested or worse.
In practice, then, coping with insecurity and governing local security requires often 
tenuous and yet constant cooperation between local security actors, local authorities, 
community leaders, dignitaries and armed groups. They regularly exchange with one 
another—within the framework of the CLS, in ad hoc and reactive CLSe meetings (as in 
Kasheke), in emergency situations (as in Lumbishi) or during accidental encounters on the 
street, in restaurants or bars. Although some of these parties may sometimes be part of 
the problem, without their support, solutions are difficult to find. 
That constant exchange—to keep everyone engaged, to keep talking and to keep all chan-
nels of communication open—may therefore be the single most important facet of how 
authorities and communities attempt to govern security in practice. Importantly, these 
local everyday practices of communication and inclusion are not dissimilar to the ambi-
tions and spirit of the CLSP and FGs. As such, this pattern of constant communication may 
serve as a reminder about the value of learning from what works on the ground. That state 
and non-state security actors do keep talking in an attempt to resolve concerns on both 
sides as and where feasible may also serve to counterbalance their image as commonly 
portrayed in international media of being irrational, greedy or violent. 
From scarcity to inaccessibility, and from tugs-of-war to civil society infighting, the real-
ities of security governance in Kalehe are challenging. Nonetheless, communities come 
together with state and non-state security actors to negotiate and forge precarious and 
fast-shifting arrangements in order to cope with insecurity. The practices of security gover-
nance that have developed may indeed echo the spirit of the CLSPs and FGs, which draw 
on the reforms of the police and decentralization. Nevertheless, outside interventions, 
84  Interview with local administrator, Numbi, 11 July 2019.
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which aim to support the establishment of CLSPs and FGs, face a multitude of challenges 
and can be disruptive themselves. 
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5. Supporting the application of the 2013 CLSP 
decree in Buhavu 
Due to its long history of armed conflict and ongoing armed group activity, Kalehe looks 
back on an extensive history of outside engagement in its security matters. Over the last 
ten years, outside interventions have been dominated by stabilization approaches, policies 
and missions, which attempt to infuse stability in still fragile post-conflict settings and lay 
the foundations for state reconstruction and socio-economic development.85 Kalehe has 
been a priority zone of the DRC government stabilization programme, the Reconstruction 
Plan for Eastern DRC (STAREC) since its inception in 2009. As such, it has been the stage 
for countless such programmes by national and international NGOs, UN bodies and the 
DRC peacekeeping mission. Many of these programmes are funded by the international 
stabilization strategy that supports STAREC, the International Security and Stabilization 
Support Strategy (I4S).86
One programme which is aligned with I4S is the programme ‘Inawezekana Kalehe’, imple-
mented by a consortium made up of three Dutch organizations—ZOA, VNGi and War Child 
Holland—and funded by the Dutch government’s Addressing Root Causes (ARC) fund. It 
has a budget of EUR 8.2 million (USD 9.2 million) and will run from 2017 to 2021. Aligned 
with the Dutch government, a key donor to the I4S, consortium activities are aligned with 
central pillars of the strategy, including the focus on peaceful community conflict resolu-
tion, improved local governance, mutual accountability between the local population and 
local government, and the empowerment of women and youth. ARC focus zones cover 
four of the seven Buhavu groupements, including the Hauts Plateaux with its complex 
conflicts and armed group activity. In the consortium, VNGi promotes the restoration 
of state authority and mutual accountability between government and communities. In 
doing so, it works directly with provincial, territorial, chieftaincy and groupement author-
ities. In line with ARC objectives around improved governance and mutual accountability, 
VNGi has supported the establishment of the FGs at the groupement level and has also 
been exploring support to create a CLSP at the chieftaincy level. 
These are ambitious interventions oriented to changing current security governance 
structures and logics, along with power relations between authorities, security actors and 
local communities. Tracing the efforts to implement the CLSP in rural areas showcases 
both several key challenges for such outside interventions and a potential opportunity. 
85  Emily Paddon and Guillaume Lacaille, ‘Stabilising the Congo’, Forced Migration Policy Briefing 
9, Oxford: University of Oxford Refugee Studies Centre, 2011; Rift Valley Institute, ‘Stabilization in 
Eastern and Central Africa: Insights from Somalia, South Sudan and the DRC’, London: Rift Valley 
Institute, 2014. 
86  Also known as ISSS or I4S. See: International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy, 
‘International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy, 2013–2017’, 2013. 
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Challenges include misunderstandings, confusion and manipulation, and the creation 
of parallel civil society structures. The opportunity consists of providing avenues for 
supporting local authorities and communities through better use of existing funds to 
improve local security. 
Limits to applying the CLSP
While the police play an important role in I4S, stabilization does not necessarily align 
smoothly with police reform and its underlying assumption that a sufficient degree of 
stability already prevails. Police reform and its own CLSP and FGs are complex subject 
matters in themselves. The UK-funded SSAPR, for example, took several years to sensitize 
communities, authorities and the police on police reform objectives and principles. The 
programme had a large roster of Congolese and international experts on police reform 
and a budget of GBP 60 million (USD 87 million) at its disposal. SSAPR’s focus was on 
cities, where infrastructure and proximity made project implementation much faster and 
cheaper. Despite these relative advantages, SSAPR faced many difficulties in implementing 
police reform.87 VNGi aims to do the same but with less time, a smaller budget, a much 
smaller team, less expertise and in remote rural areas. Unsurprisingly, several difficulties 
have emerged. 
First, in order to effectively support police reform, winning over the police is essential. 
While most police officers appreciate the notion of proximity policing, putting its prin-
ciples into practice necessitates training, money and equipment and thus constitutes a 
major challenge. A police officer complains, ‘We remain at the level of words but not 
action.’88 He adds: ‘We only talk about what the police should not do. But what about 
what the police should do?’89 International NGOs and donors are often reluctant to train 
and provide equipment to the police or subsidize their work due to a mix of concerns 
about sustainability, substituting for core state responsibilities, the risk of embezzlement 
and, worse, giving materials to some who may use them against civilians.90 VNGi does not 
directly support the police, which makes it difficult to gain sufficient leverage with the PNC 
and next to impossible to turn them into a proactive proximity police that follows the logic 
of the intended reform and the CLSP. Directly linked to this is a lack of understanding of 
police reform principles among the police themselves. Many police officers in Kalehe have 
never been trained, some do not speak French and others cannot write. In the words of 
87  Palladium, ‘Independent Evaluation of the Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform 
Programme: Final Evaluation Report’, London: Palladium, 2015; Thill, et al., ‘Everyday police life’. 
88  Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019.
89  Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019.
90  Ibrahim Bangura, ‘Democratically Transformed or Business as Usual: The Sierra Leone 
Police and Democratic Policing in Sierra Leone’, Stability: International Journal of Security & 
Development 7/1 (2018); Keith Biddle, ‘Interview with Keith Biddle’, Innovations for Successful 
Societies, Oral History Programme, Princeton: Princeton University, 2007. 
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one police officer, while the ‘will is there, the notions that VNGi brings along are interna-
tional notions. Not everyone has the capacity to understand.’91 
Second, interventions by international NGOs often occur at the same time in the same 
sector, with their own sometimes contradictory logics. They also tend to follow in the 
footsteps of past programmes run by yet other organizations, all of which shapes how 
they are perceived by supposed beneficiaries. Some police officers have been irritated 
by past NGO interventions, which has made them sceptical about ARC efforts. Search for 
Common Ground, for example, which had previously been working with the Kalehe police 
in its long-running Lobi Mokolo Ya Siku (tomorrow is another day) programme, reportedly 
told communities that according to the first of the ten golden rules of police reform, police 
services were free. While this is certainly true, a lack of explanation and contextualization 
left police officers confused.92 The same officer rhetorically asks: ‘Is this true? It is a lie’93 as 
it ignores the fact that police charge fines for law violations. He complains that imposing 
fines now often leads to civil disobedience because people refuse to pay. 
Another police officer echoes the feeling that NGO work insists too much on citizen rights 
without supporting the police: ‘Today, people talk about human rights but we think that 
the rights of police also exist! Human rights, yes, but the police, too! People do not respect 
the rights of the police.’94 Others point to the fact that international NGOs also need to 
intervene at the level of the national government, and not only at the local level: ‘I don’t 
know if Search [for Common Ground] also lobbies the government, whose job it is to 
equip the police for us to guarantee this free service.’ 
In terms of the CLSP and FGs, his colleague further nuances this analysis by underlining 
the important aspect of community participation within these platforms and that they 
therefore should be embedded within the Congolese state: ‘Listen! The forum de quartier 
[forum de groupement in rural areas] is the most appropriate way to diagnose the popu-
lation’s security problems because the state will not go away but Search [for Common 
Ground] has left. Any NGO can leave but the state will stay.’ 
Third, there have also been significant obstacles to the establishment of the FGs, which 
constitute the bedrock of police–community partnership and accountability. Initially, ARC 
intended to cover four of the seven groupements in Buhavu, with particular focus on the 
Hauts Plateaux and its complex conflicts and armed group activity. While this may make 
91  Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019. The following quotes are also derived from 
this source.
92  Search for Common Ground, ‘Final Evaluation: Phase IV of Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika’, November 
2018.
93  Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019.
94  Participants in focus group with police officers, Minova, 8 July 2019. The following quotes 
are also derived from this source.
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sense for stabilization,95 it goes against the logic of police reform and the CLSP, which 
relies on reports from all groupements and their FGs to develop the Plan local de sécurité 
(PLS, local security plan). VNGi therefore extended its scope to include all seven. Conse-
quently, its already relatively limited budget now has to make do with this expansion, 
stretching capacities ever thinner. Since the beginning of the project, for example, chief-
taincy sources are not able to confirm with confidence that any actual CLSP meeting has 
ever taken place.96 Moreover, the lack of a PLS and the existence of a PAS (Plan d’action de 
sécurité, Security Action Plan) further vindicate their lack of interest in changing existing 
security governance. A lack of will, then, on the side of the chieftaincy, and the realities of 
rural areas, where authorities have to cover vast distances to attend far away meetings, 
certainly play their part in the difficulties of setting up a CLSP. A limited budget, few staff 
and scarce time on the side of VNGi, however, do not help in ensuring the support and 
follow up that is required when the objective is to transform something as complex as the 
governance of local security. 
Somewhat more concerning is the fact that some international NGOs also engaging in 
security sector reform pursue different logics than that of ARC, opting instead to promote 
the CLS and CLSe because they remain unconvinced by the CLSP and its FGs, despite the 
latter being rooted in Congolese law. A main reason for this seems to be the difficulty 
in engaging chieftaincies on matters of local security. Due to the reluctance of chiefs, 
some international NGOs are actively lobbying the national government in Kinshasa to 
further strengthen the role of the CLS and CLSe by anchoring them in a legal framework 
in order to more easily work with territorial administrations, instead of chieftaincies, on 
security matters. Indeed, ARC and VNGi ultimately decided to proceed with the process of 
drafting a security action plan, a key CLSP output, at the territorial level. In January 2019, 
the territorial administration published the PAS, which draws on the different FG secu-
rity diagnoses and was elaborated under the supervision of the territorial administrator, 
not the customary chief. Although this circumvents the problem of the non-functioning 
CLSP, it does not resolve the issue that the territory lacks the funds to finance the actions 
called for in the plan. While the PAS builds on the FG security diagnoses—a definite step 
forward—it leaves little decision-making power on issues of security at the level of the 
chieftaincy, thus keeping security governance largely centralized. Finally, this circumven-
tion may risk increasing tensions between chieftaincy and territory, further complicating 
collaboration and simultaneously creating potential competition on matters of security.97
95  An expert on Kalehe, who participated in an earlier ARC conceptual meeting, says that 
focusing on the Hauts Plateaux would also have been dangerous as it may have been perceived 
as favouring its Rwandophone communities and would thus would have risked exacerbating 
existing tensions among them and autochtonous groups, thus countering any efforts at 
stabilization. Interview with Kalehe expert, Bukavu, 19 July 2019. 
96  Exchanges with agents of Buhavu chieftaincy, WhatsApp messaging, 11 October 2019 and 
Bukavu, 28 Novemeber 2019.
97  Interview with staff of international NGO, Bukavu, 29 June 2019; interview with staff of 
international NGO, Bukavu, 30 June 2019.
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Furthermore, introducing the language of the CLSP and FGs as new tools into existing 
security governance practice without clarifying their purpose and how they relate to and 
operate alongside the existing CLS and CLSe has led to a fair amount of confusion. Making 
sense of this amalgam of committees and councils is not easy for local communities and 
security actors, who are rarely familiar with their legal frameworks and practical intrica-
cies. Many ARC government partners at the groupement, chieftaincy and territorial level 
who are meant to lead these meetings could not always distinguish these various acro-
nyms, with some using the CLSP, FG and CLSe or CLS and CLSP interchangeably.98 The 
prevailing confusion once again points to the limited time and budget the consortium has 
to invest in sensitization, which leads to a superficial understanding of the CLSP decree 
and the FGs, their purpose and function, and how they relate to the CLS and CLSe. In turn, 
this lack of understanding leads their conveners to not fully appropriate the logic of police 
reform and its proximity police.
Moreover, the CLSP decree postulates that its committee is made up of the chieftaincy 
(the sector or municipality chief), which presides over the trimester meetings, the police 
commander, an official of the justice ministry and two representatives of civil society. 
Article 9 of the decree also gives the CLSP president the liberty to invite anyone else rele-
vant to discussing matters of local security. According to a civil society member involved 
in drafting the CLSP decree, this article was added precisely because some were worried 
that, on the one hand, in the context of the eastern DRC, the army, and intelligence and 
migration services would have to participate for meetings to be effective and, on the other 
hand, that two civil society delegates would not necessarily be sufficient to represent the 
diversity of civil society as a whole.99 The subtlety of this article needs to be appreciated 
by those from VNGi and the chieftaincy, however, for the CLSP to unfold its full potential. 
The FGs should function according to a similarly flexible logic, which bends itself to local 
realities. In Kalehe as in Bukavu, for instance, the FGs are not only organized to discuss 
concerns around local security but also to address matters of local development and 
priorities to be funded by the participatory budget. Using the FG for multiple purposes 
only strengthens community–state relations and fosters a degree of transparency and 
accountability. A formal decision made by the Buhavu mwami in March 2018, however, 
strictly defines the composition of FGs, lending unnecessary rigidity to what should be 
flexible. In addition to a long list of local authorities and community representatives, the 
March 2018 decision mentions five members of the security forces, to be led by the local 
head of the police.100 In an attempt to encourage the Buloho chief to follow the practice 
of the FGs in his chieftaincy, the territorial administrator also made a similar decision at 
98  Interviews with relevant agents and representatives in Kalehe-centre and Buzi, July 2019; 
observations during workshop on security governance and the CLSP decree in Bukavu, 27-29 
November 2019. 
99  Interview with former civil society member, Kalehe-centre, 6 July 2019.
100 Chieftaincy of Buhavu, ‘Décision nr. 001 portant institutionalisation des forums des 
groupements dans les sept groupements de la chefferie de Buhavu’, Buhavu: Chieftaincy of 
Buhavu, 28 March 2018 (on file with author).
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the level of the territory in June 2018. The list of qualified participants drawn up by the 
territorial administrator differs from that of the mwami, omitting some and, interestingly, 
explicitly mentioning five members of police—and not security forces, which would have 
included army, intelligence and migration services.101 Neither decision provides for flexi-
bility in composition beyond those listed. Moreover, their differences create a degree of 
legal ambivalence, which provides an easy excuse for groupement chiefs not to organize 
any meetings as they can claim not to know which decision to follow.
In a context such as Kalehe, the FARDC (Forces armées de la république démocratique du 
Congo, Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo) is undoubtedly the most 
important state security actor. An army officer mentions, however, that he had never 
been invited to an FG meeting.102 A groupement chief also mentions that while he agreed 
that the FARDC are primary partners in matters of security, they are not invited to the FGs, 
which has led army officers to tease them about this rather obvious flaw in the logic of 
these new security governance platforms.103 A civil society activist offers another criticism; 
namely, that the groupement chiefs select civil society participants, inviting only those 
who are favourable to him and not necessarily those truly representative of communities: 
‘All those there [in the FG], we don’t even know them.’104 A police officer strongly criticizes 
this kind of manipulation, which leads to a lack of relaying information back to citizens: 
Everyone should be represented but to say that only some can participate is 
not good. As it is only the leaders who participate, the population doesn’t know 
anything about what is happening. They don’t even know anything about what 
we talk about in meetings. If you ask the population, they know nothing! Who 
among the population can reply to you? Because it is only the leaders who partic-
ipate but the people know nothing.105
The new practice of organizing the FGs in Buhavu, albeit on an irregular basis, is an 
important step forward in the long process of integrating community needs into local 
security governance. Nevertheless, it seems that the main purpose of the CLSP and FGs is 
misunderstood, ignored or manipulated. A central reason may lie in the ARC consortium 
approach to civil society. Knowing full well the difficulties of working with established 
civil society organizations and seeking more direct and representative partnerships with 
communities, particularly marginalized and minority groups, the consortium decided 
to seek out more direct community buy-in through its own community mobilization 
approach. The result of that process is the cadre de concertation (coordination cadre).
101  Territory of Kalehe, ‘Décision nr. 5072/012/531/BUR-AT/KLH/2018 du 04/06/2018 portant 
institutionalisation des forums des groupements dans le territoire de Kalehe’, 4 June 2018 (on file 
with author). 
102  Interview with senior army officer, 9 July 2019. 
103  Interview with former groupement chief, Bukavu, 2 July 2019. 
104  Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019.
105  Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019.
GoverninG local security in the eastern conGo 43
the cadre de concertation
Engaging civil society is a prerequisite for most international NGO and donor programmes 
in the eastern DRC. The fragmented and politicized nature of this region, however, makes 
such work a delicate matter. ARC tried to circumvent this by creating the cadre de concer-
tation through an approach led by ZOA to sensitize large and varied social groups across 
communities and foster ownership and democratic work approaches. The cadre was 
put together through a series of selection and election processes. First, each Buhavu 
groupement brought together a total of 40 representatives, made up of a wide range of 
associations and organizations with a particular focus on marginalized groups, such as 
youth, women, fisher folk and disabled people. These 40 representatives chose 10 among 
themselves to form the directorial committee for all 7 groupements. The committee 
sent three representatives to the territorial level, who held a vote to select their territo-
rial representative. Once the representatives had been chosen, they became the go-to 
persons for all consortium-related activities involving local communities. In other words, 
they were now seen as the legitimate voices of the local communities.106 Not everyone, 
however, is convinced about this process and its outcome.
One civil society member argues that the cadre is not large enough and hence not 
sufficiently inclusive—considering the size of the seven Buzi groupements, he says, 40 
members are simply too few.107 Another adds that villages have been neglected: ‘At the 
level of the village, there is a vacuum. One should have started at the base.’108 According 
to him, this considerably limits the effectiveness of the cadre as, ultimately, any admin-
istrative decision requires the cooperation of the village chiefs.109 The difficulties in the 
selection process extend further. According to a member of the Muslim community, the 
third biggest religion in the Congo, their faith organization has not yet been approached 
by the consortium.110 A civil society representative in Numbi also complains that the 
selection process has marginalized the communities of the Hauts Plateaux because it was 
dominated by those from Buzi’s coastline, who voted for their own, reflecting some of the 
historical fault lines in Buhavu and Buzi.111 She continues to say that while there is some-
what of a rapprochement at the moment, the cadre and the other civil society umbrella 
organizations each continue to pursue their own activities.112 
Others go further and accuse the cadre of not doing the work it is supposed to do. One 
member of civil society says that to his knowledge, the cadre neither coordinates among 
106  Interviews with civil society and cadre members, Kalehe-centre, 5 and 6 July 2019.
107  Interview with member of civil society, Minova, 10 July 2019.
108  Interview with member of civil society, Kalungu, 8 July 2019.
109  Interview with member of civil society, Kalungu, 8 July 2019.
110  Interview with member of Muslim community, Minova, 10 July 2019.
111  Interview with member of civil society, Numbi, 11 July 2019.
112  Interview with member of civil society, Numbi, 11 July 2019. This observation is reinforced 
in an interview with a police officer, Minova, 9 July 2019.
rift valley institute and vnG international report 44
its different constituents nor does it report back to communities.113 While civil society 
does not have a single voice, the cadre pretends it does (on the grounds that it is fully 
inclusive) and ARC buys in to this view. A civil society colleague also adds that the cadre is 
only active when its activities are financed by ARC; without its support, little happens.114 
Another points to the unsustainability of this approach: ‘What VNGi does is good but once 
they leave, we return to zero. We only meet when VNGi is there.’115 Herein lies a crucial 
challenge. Similar to civil servants, those who work for civil society organizations do not 
have a permanent salary. They live off the activities those organizations implement, which 
are predominantly funded by international organizations. Being a partner in or affiliated 
to such projects is thus also a matter of livelihood. To ensure relations with international 
partners requires constant positioning and investment in public relations. Stakes are high 
and competition fierce. It is, then, common for those who miss out on this or that project 
to boycott its activities or speak badly about it, and vice versa. For example, a member of 
a civil society umbrella organization mentions that they hold weekly meetings, bringing 
together the major civil society groups, but the ARC cadre does not show up; first, they 
ask who has organized the meeting, he says, and if it is not one of the ARC consortium 
international NGOs, they are not interested.116 
Civil society associations and their leaders have become very good at positioning them-
selves in a variety of networks in order to tap as many of these international financial flows 
as possible. It thus happens that individuals occupy several roles in the same project or 
across rival organizations. An interviewee indicates, for example, that a key cadre member 
was also the full-time adviser on matters of agriculture for the consortium. Several cadre 
members are also members of the traditional civil society umbrella organizations at 
groupement level.117 While this recycling of personnel can have advantages in mobilizing 
across interest groups, it also makes individual figures extremely influential and can lead 
to serious conflicts of interest, especially when they pursue their own political agendas.
Finally, the fact that the cadre is a fabrication by outsiders considerably limits its impact. 
As one of its members says, ‘Someone had to put us together.’118 The cadre only exists in 
Kalehe, where ARC is active, but ARC does not maintain similarly far-reaching networks 
as other civil society structures do at the provincial and national level. As a member of a 
longer-standing umbrella organization puts it: ‘We do it the traditional way. When I write 
113  Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019; regular conversations 
with staff of international NGO, June, July and November 2019. 
114  Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019; interview with member 
of youth association, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019. 
115  Interview with member of civil society, Minova, 10 July 2019. The cadre was formed by 
ZOA and not VNGi. Its representatives, however, participate in several of consortium activities 
regardless of which consortium member leads them. 
116  Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019; interview with member 
of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019.
117  Interview with member of youth association, Kalehe-centr, 5 July 2019.
118  Interview with member of cadre, Kalehe-centre, 6 July 2019.
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a report, I send it to Bukavu. He [the cadre member], when he writes a report, where 
does he send it to? Is our province aware of the cadre? It has to be done in a formal way, 
and not informally.’119 Although the cadre is the only civil society presence invited to ARC 
security-related activities, it is not involved in much longer established security meetings, 
such as the CLS or CLSe. The same representative says that it is their civil society, which 
is updated about or sometimes invited to meetings at the level of the territory, sector 
and groupement.120 Cadre representatives may thus miss out on crucial information and 
decision-making processes around local security. Worse, the lack of cadre roots in local 
communities and the personal ambitions of its members also result in a failure to do what 
is arguably their most important job: Relaying information back to the people. 
Due to the interests at stake—the financial gains and political positioning to be made 
through association with an international consortium—in a short time, the cadre has 
turned from an intended loose and community-rooted network into a full-fledged struc-
ture with a clear hierarchy. It has become yet another layer of civil society claiming to 
be an umbrella organization but does little to sensitize the communities it is meant to 
represent, hampering the work of VNGi on local security governance. The situation is not 
completely bleak, however. In addition to its work on the CLSP and FGs, VNGi has also 
been engaging on governance around local development through the budget participatif 
(participatory budget), which seems to have borne some fruit. Its initial achievements 
may indicate avenues for that budget to also play a role in local security.  
the budget participatif
The participatory budget allows local citizens to shape a part of their local administration 
budget and help determine investment projects in their communities, according to their 
own priorities. Invented and trialled for the first time in Porto Alegre in Brazil in 1989, the 
idea was quickly picked up by major financial and development institutions and applied 
across the world.121 In the Congo, the participatory budget piloted in the province of 
South Kivu in 2011, with support from the World Bank. One year later, a provincial decree 
institutionalized it in the public finances of the ETDs. Since 2017, ARC has supported the 
implementation of that decree into practice in the chieftaincy of Buhavu.
The Buhavu participatory budget is largely dedicated to socio-economic development and 
is not meant to cover matters of local security. In late 2018, for example, the council of 
the participatory budget, the Conseil Local de Développement (CLD, Local Development 
Council), made up of the seven groupement chiefs, civil society organizations, and repre-
sentatives from women, youth, faith and business groups in Buhavu, agreed on a list of 
nine development projects. These included water and environment projects, the expan-
119  Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019.
120  Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019.
121  Osmany Porto de Oliveira, ‘La diffusion globale du budget participatif : le rôle des 
“ambassadeurs” de la participation et des institutions internationals’, Participations 1/14 (2016): 
91–120.
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sion of a school, road construction and rehabilitation, and the construction of an office for 
one of the groupement chiefs (by far the most expensive investment). The participatory 
budget amounts to a total of USD 142,000, of which Buhavu covers USD 42,000 or approx-
imately 30 per cent. The rest is to be financed by its international partners.122
Some have welcomed the budget as it has brought more transparency in the management 
of chieftaincy finances. A member of civil society admits that previously, ‘There was no 
way to separate the chieftaincy from the mwami.’123 A colleague agrees: ‘In any case, the 
VNGi has brought what did not exist before in to the culture of our chiefs and the people 
from the chieftaincy.’124 At the same time, however, she retained a degree of scepticism 
as to the capacity and willingness of the chieftaincy to implement these projects. So far, 
she says, they have never seen any results from their taxes, which have gone to the chief-
taincy. 
In theory, the mechanism of the participatory budget could also be used to contribute to 
the funding of projects with a direct link to matters of local security. The police, however, 
maintain doubts due to the chieftaincy track record in supporting security. As one police 
officer explains, ‘So, the participatory budget… What customary chief can accept to give 
money to the police while he knows that this is his share and nobody can come and bother 
him?’125 Nevertheless, once the mwami acknowledge their role in local security, the 
participatory budget could create new avenues for change. Pressure from international 
partners and civil society could make a real difference here.
It is clear that outside interventions face several important challenges when engaging 
with existing security governance structures. The participatory budget mechanism shows, 
however, that some investment projects—as modest as they may be—are funded by the 
chieftaincy and could also be turned towards matters of local security. This would require 
effective lobbying to be successful.  
122  Chieftaincy of Buhavu, ‘Procès verbal portant les projets d’investissements retenus dans le 
cadre du budget participatif par la Chefferie de Buhavu pour l’exercice 2019’, Buhavu: Chieftaincy 
of Buhavu, 16 November 2018; Chieftaincy of Buhavu, ‘Plan annuel d’investissement de la 
Chefferie de Buhavu exercice 2019’, Buhavu: Chieftaincy of Buhavu, March 2019 (on file with 
author).
123  Interview with member of civil society, Kalungu, 8 July 2019.
124  Interview with member of civil society, Minova, 10 July 2019.
125  Participant in focus group with police officers, Minova, 8 July 2019.
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6. Conclusion and policy considerations
Security governance in Kalehe, and the Congo as a whole, is marked by a long history of scar-
city, coercion and fragmentation. It is also characterized by a plurality of actors constantly 
negotiating precarious and fleeting arrangements to cope with the worst forms of insecurity. 
Moreover, security governance is steeped in larger logics of patronage, which turn security and 
its institutions into lucrative sources of revenue, competed over by state and non-state actors. 
While it may be difficult for outside international NGO interventions to break these funda-
mental logics, it is nevertheless important to understand what is at stake to avoid projects that 
fuel competition over resources. 
Decentralization and police reform disrupt existing security governance arrangements. The 
former has led chiefs of newly decentralized entities to mimic long-standing state practices 
of resource extraction without providing any services in return. In Kalehe and the chieftaincy 
of Buhavu, decentralization has led to a tug-of-war between administrative authorities. Those 
with the means to invest in security are not in the habit, nor have the clout to do so; and 
those who deal with security and do have the required experience, lack the funds for it. If this 
fundamental dilemma is not addressed, outside interventions risk being reduced to additional 
variables for local actors to circumvent, co-opt, manipulate or undermine according to their 
own interests. 
The core objective of police reform—and reform of the security sector as a whole—is to 
promote a fundamental shift in security logics from the state to the human being. This requires 
a major overhaul of security governance, which is a generational undertaking because it 
threatens to undermine the very foundations of power of those responsible for implementing 
the reform. For outsiders, supporting such a reform requires open eyes and an iron will to 
persevere despite setbacks. Engagement demands a comprehensive, profound and enduring 
commitment, a considerable budget and much expertise on the local context and its complex 
dynamics. 
Congolese president Félix Tshisekedi Tshilombo and South Kivu governor Théo Ngwabije Kasi 
have both reaffirmed their support for police reform. Despite the challenges, donors and inter-
national NGOs should aim to keep them to their word and support their plans. To do so within 
existing budgetary and time constraints, five considerations may be worth exploring further: 
Thinking human security; engaging the police; using the CLSP and FGs to their full potential; 
budgeting for security; and mobilizing the chieftaincy.
thinking human security 
Security should not be reduced to the protection of national and state interests, such as the 
fight against armed groups. Rather, it has a fundamental human dimension directly linked to 
the everyday needs of the population. Human security fosters thought about concrete chal-
rift valley institute and vnG international report 48
lenges and collectively finding practical solutions that can improve the lived experience of 
Congolese citizens. Such solutions do not always require significant means; neither are they 
linked by default to state security actors and nor do they need to be initiated from above. 
Setting up a suggestion letterbox in front of a police station to anonymously provide tips to the 
police or installing public lighting at a market place are only two relatively cost-effective exam-
ples with real life impact. The sooner that those concerned with security governance start 
thinking in terms of human security, the more likely that their proposals and actions will align 
with the principle of putting community security needs at the heart of their initiatives. Thinking 
human security is thus a first and fundamental step, which underlies the following more prac-
tice-oriented suggestions.
Engaging the police
For outside interventions in local security governance, it is of primary importance to directly 
engage with and involve the police. While initial reluctance may be understandable due to the 
human rights track record of the PNC, not doing so is counterproductive. After all, the CLSP 
and FG are the direct result of police reform and function as the key instrument in improving 
police–community relations. Convincing ETD chiefs and civil society of the purpose of the CLSP 
and FGs is therefore as important as ensuring PNC buy-in. This means that interventions should 
have a similar budget at their disposal for activities aimed at the police as for those aimed at 
chiefs and civil society. Providing human rights and basic legal training, supporting logistics 
and facilitating police–community activities such as those conducted by Search for Common 
Ground should all be considered.
Using the CLSP and FGs to their full potential 
The CLSP and FGs offer a significant opportunity to lay the groundwork for more accountability 
and increased proximity between security actors, local administrations and local communities. 
Using them to their full potential is therefore important. As the example of Buhavu shows, 
however, this does not yet seem to be the case. In part, this is due to the challenges of logistics 
and financing and the lack of will to invest time and energy into them. It is also due to a misun-
derstanding of their purpose. At least in terms of the latter, outside interventions should be 
able to help. First and foremost, the CLSP does not replace but rather complements the CLS. 
The CLSP builds on the decentralized ETD budget and the CLSP fund, which allows local author-
ities and communities to coordinate, plan and seek co-funding for and intervene in matters of 
human security on their own. The CLS, in the meantime, deals with matters of state security, 
such as the fight against armed groups, and continues to take operational decisions that can 
also be in support of CLSP plans.
The experience of past police reform support programmes shows that legal texts best follow 
what works in practice, and not vice versa. For local administrators, donors and implementers, 
the golden rule to maximize the CLSP and FGs should therefore be to consider their legal texts as 
guiding instruments with the flexibility to bend to local exigencies of the moment. They should 
be tools to facilitate governance in adverse climates and to empower the administrator who 
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has to face them. In sum, the spirit of the law—communication and inclusion—should prevail 
over its letter. Most importantly, its letter should not become an excuse to avoid engagement. 
While the CLSP decree provides flexibility for practical adaptation, groupement chiefs should 
take the leeway necessary to adapt the chieftaincy and territory decisions on the FG to their 
own local security needs. The efforts of the chieftaincy and international partners should ulti-
mately be geared towards promoting communication and inclusion on matters of local security 
between all parties—to keep everyone engaged and talking. The everyday security practices 
of some local administrators, such as post and village chiefs, may serve as an inspiration as 
to how to govern security in conditions as challenging as those in Kalehe. Finally, lessons can 
be learned from the cities and municipalities where police reform was piloted and where the 
CLSPs and FQs are still functioning in late 2019. Mobilizing the existing expertise from the many 
Congolese specialists, who were and continue to be involved in their implementation, could be 
a valuable exercise for any new outside intervention in security governance. 
Budgeting for security
Despite stark budgetary shortfalls on all fronts, there is nonetheless some leeway in existing 
budgets to mobilize more funds for local security projects. On the one hand, the Fonds secret 
de recherche (FRS) give ETD chiefs a considerable budget for security-related expenses, along 
with much discretion on how to use it. While the FSR seems to fund some ad hoc expenses 
related to organizing CLS meetings, it should be able to go beyond this and also invest in local 
projects conducive to decreasing perceived and actual insecurity. For the FSR to be sufficiently 
endowed, international partners could support strengthening the chieftaincy tax collection 
capacity. Donors could also lobby the finance ministry and the ministry for budgeting to 
break down the FSR further to include budget items explicitly dedicated to security-oriented 
community projects. In this case, it is important to remember that these same ministries are 
not immune to the logics of patronage; lobbying would thus have to take into account the clien-
telist practices they themselves may engage in.126
On the other hand, the donor supported participatory budget has shown some successes since 
its launch in South Kivu. While its funds have been dedicated to socio-economic development 
projects, nothing excludes the possibility of earmarking one or two projects per year for more 
security-oriented initiatives. Taking human security and preventative policing as their corner-
stones, such initiatives can still have an important developmental dimension: Digging water 
wells closer to villages, erecting public lighting around markets, rehabilitating roads such as 
that between Kalungu and Numbi, or providing meals for police on night patrol are all sensible 
investments with a direct impact on citizen and police livelihoods and should be able to be 
funded by the FSR or the participatory budget, or a combination of both. 
Article 15 of the CLSP decree also envisions setting up a provincial fund to finance its own proj-
ects emanating from local security plans. This fund, which gives donors the option to contribute 
126  Stylianos Moshonas, ‘The politics of civil service reform in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 52 (2014): 251–276.
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directly to it, would open up a third avenue for mobilizing financial means for local security. 
It does, however, require to be set up through a provincial by-law passed by the governor. 
According to the provincial minister of interior, a draft by-law is currently on the desk of the 
governor.127 Civil society, partners and donors should continue lobbying for its signature and 
subsequent implementation. The availability of adequate financing is not sufficient, however, 
there must also be the will to spend funds on security.  
Mobilizing the chieftaincy 
The most difficult consideration is how to effectively encourage customary chiefs to take a 
more active role in the security of their local populations. Identifying an existing role model 
in the Congo who can inspire others could be an option. The Congo is not the only country 
in this region of Africa in which customary chiefs still play an important role. Drawing on the 
experiences of elders in neighbouring countries in matters of security provision may similarly 
convince some bwami to become more engaged. Remarkable efforts are already underway 
at the groupement level; for example, ARC has invited some chiefs to join workshops in neigh-
bouring countries and to meet their counterparts there to share experiences and exchange 
lessons. Convincing the mwami to participate in such workshops could be a major step forward.
In parallel, it is as important to move towards more conducive working relations between the 
ETD chiefs and the decentralized authorities. As long as they are seen as a genuine broker, 
outside interveners should be able to help create the necessary climate for such encounters 
at little cost. The better these relations, the easier it will be to work together on budgets and 
projects, and to complement efforts on both sides in improving local security. The oft repeated 
phrase of police reform—security is everyone’s business—ultimately holds true. This should 
encourage various local authorities to work together to overcome obstacles. 
In the end, where does this leave the question of the applicability of the CLSP decree in a rural 
context? In short, to quote a police officer, ‘Security governance depends on those who have to 
apply it.’128 In this sense, nothing prevents the CLSP decree from being applied per se—it comes 
down to the will of those who are meant to enact it. For outside interventions, it is important 
to build on existing practice and legal frameworks. The human security-oriented CLSP and FQs 
exist not only in national law and in territorial and ETD decisions but also in urban practice—
and in their spirit in rural practice at the lowest administrative level. The state security-centred 
CLS is a long-standing and nationwide convention that complements the CLSP by tackling those 
security risks the latter is ill-suited to address. Outside interventions should thus limit time and 
resources invested in advocating for amendments to existing law or in drafting new legislation. 
They should certainly not aim to go against the letter of these laws but rather help enable the 
spirit of the law to take hold by preparing the ground on which these laws stand. 
127  Provincial minister of interior of South Kivu, speech delivered during a workshop in Bukavu, 
27 November 2019.
128  Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019.
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Glossary of acronyms, words and phrases
ARC Addressing Root Causes; consortium of three Dutch 
international NGOs—ZOA, War Child Holland and 
VNG International 
Article 15 refers to practices of improvisation and fending for 
oneself; the phrase originates in an imaginary article 
of the 1960 constitution of secessionist South Kasai 
that encourages its officials to improvise in times of 
need
AT administrateur territorial, territorial administrator
budget participatif  participatory budget
cadre de concertation  coordination cadre
chefferie  chieftaincy, decentralized administrative entity locat-
ed below the territory and above the groupement 
(grouping); they are headed by a traditional chief or 
mwami (customary chief), a hereditary position
CLS  Conseil local de sécurité, Local Security Council
CLSe Conseil local de sécurité élargi, extended Local Secu-
rity Council
CLSP Conseil local pour la sécurité de proximité, Local 
Council for Proximity Security
débrouillez-vous  fend for yourselves, also referred to as ‘Système D’
DFID Department for International Development
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
ETD entités territoriales décentralisées, decentralized 
territorial entities
entités territoriales déconcentrées  deconcentrated territorial entities, which, as op-
posed to the relatively autonomous ETDs (see 
above), remain executive bodies of the central ad-
ministration and its policies, financially dependent 
on the latter and without legal personality of their 
own
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FARDC Forces armées de la république démocratique du 
Congo, Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo
FG Forum de groupement, Grouping Forum
FP Force publique, Public Force
FQ Forum de quartier, Neighbourhood Forum
FSR Fonds secrets de recherche, Secret Research Fund
groupement  grouping
mwami  customary chief
PAS Plan d’action de sécurité, Security Action Plan
PLS Plan local de sécurité, Local Security Plan
PNC Police Nationale Congolaise, Congolese National 
Police
secteur sector, decentralized administrative entity located 
below the territory and above the groupement; sec-
tors are headed by a locally elected chef de secteur 
(sector chief)
SSAPR Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform; 
DFID-funded programme, running from 2009 to 
2015 and supporting police reform in the DRC
STAREC Reconstruction Plan for Eastern DRC 
Sûreté Security, name of the Belgian colonial intelligence 
agency 
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